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1. Introduction 
As aviation adopts new and increasingly complex operational paradigms, vehicle types, and technologies 
to broaden airspace capability and efficiency, maintaining a safe system will require recognition and 
timely mitigation of new safety issues as they emerge and before significant consequences occur. A shift 
toward a more predictive risk mitigation capability becomes critical to meet this challenge. In-time 
safety assurance comprises monitoring, assessment, and mitigation functions that proactively reduce 
risk in complex operational environments where the interplay of hazards may not be known (and 
therefore not accounted for) during design.  These functions can also help to understand and predict 
emergent effects caused by the increased use of automation or autonomous functions that may exhibit 
unexpected non-deterministic behaviors.  The envisioned monitoring and assessment functions can look 
for precursors, anomalies, and trends (PATs) by applying model-based and data-driven methods. 
Outputs would then drive downstream mitigation(s) if needed to reduce risk. These mitigations may be 
accomplished using traditional design revision processes or via operational (and sometimes automated) 
mechanisms. The latter refers to the ‘in-time’ aspect of the system concept. 
This report comprises architecture and information requirements and considerations toward enabling 
such a capability within the domain of low altitude highly autonomous urban flight operations. This 
domain may span, for example, public-use surveillance missions flown by small unmanned aircraft (e.g., 
infrastructure inspection, facility management, emergency response, law enforcement, and/or security) 
to transportation missions flown by larger aircraft that may carry passengers or deliver products. 
Caveat: Any stated requirements in this report should be considered initial requirements that are 
intended to drive research and development (R&D). These initial requirements are likely to evolve based 
on R&D findings, refinement of operational concepts, industry advances, and new industry or regulatory 
policies or standards related to safety assurance. 
1.1. System concept 
NASA’s Aeronautics Research Mission Directorate describes a strategic plan for investigating and 
advancing in-time system-wide safety assurance (ISSA) capabilities [1]. Within this plan, it is envisioned 
that advanced safety assurance tools can be introduced to take advantage of increasing availability of 
aviation system data. The identification of safety issues will focus on scaling currently available data 
mining methods to process a broad range of data; thereby enabling a disparate set of high-fidelity 
model-based information services that can inform and track the changing nature of risk during flights. By 
using these models and information services, combined with increased speed and accuracy of analysis 
tools, safety assurance can progress toward more timely identification of PATs, thereby maintaining 
acceptable safety margins. 
As described in [1], three high-level functions are needed that can be tailored to a specific application 
domain and may span from the vehicle-level to the airspace system level (depending on the safety risks 
and risk tolerance for the domain). These functions are: 
 Monitoring – A set of information services and an underlying architecture that allows for 
acquisition, integration, and quality assurance of heterogeneous safety-relevant data that may 
come from a diverse set of sources (including vehicles). Access to these services must recognize 
that some data may require protections that de-identify the source and defend against 
corruption by unauthorized or unauthenticated sources. 
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 Assessment – A set of tools and techniques that provide timely detection, diagnosis, and a 
predictive capability regarding changes in risk and hazard states. Assessment functions should 
be capable of spanning hazard types to judge how overall safety margin is changing based on 
current context, on recent (in-flight) cascading event sequences, and on longer-term trends that 
can become evident with access to historical data maintained by monitoring functions. 
 Mitigation – A set of methods, tools, and procedures that provide for multi-agent or automated 
planning and execution of timely responses to hazardous events or event sequences when/if 
safety margins are observed or are predicted to deteriorate below acceptable levels. 
A report published by the National Academies outlines challenges that must be addressed in 
development of a similar but broader capability – an In-time Safety Assurance Management System 
(IASMS) [2]. This capability is defined within the larger context of SMS [3], which covers all aspects of 
managing safety including organizational structures, accountabilities, policies, procedures, and business 
practices. As reported in [2], the committee’s vision for an IASMS is summarized in the following 
recommendation: 
“The concept of real-time system-wide safety assurance should be approached in terms of an in-
time aviation safety management system (IASMS) that continuously monitors the national airspace 
system, assesses the data that it has collected, and then either recommends or initiates safety 
assurance actions as necessary. Some elements of such a system would function in real time or close 
to real time, while other elements would search for risks by examining trends over a time frame of 
hours, days, or even longer.” 
For the remainder of this report, we focus on a specific operational domain (i.e., application domain) – 
highly autonomous low altitude flights near and over populated urban areas. These include flights such 
as are envisioned for some Urban Air Mobility (UAM) operations [4] and many use-cases for small 
Unmanned Aircraft Systems (sUAS). 
1.2. Application domain 
From an operational perspective, the in-time safety assurance concept can be thought of as an 
extension to the way current operations are conducted, with the provision that an information-sharing 
infrastructure will be in place. This infrastructure, with both on-board and off-board elements, will 
enable the collection and monitoring of safety-relevant information, the assessment of risk (including 
predictions), and mitigation option generation and/or automated control actions (as required). To 
illustrate the concept, consider three operational phases: pre-flight, in-flight, and post-flight. 
Pre-flight – As part of a pre-flight checklist, a trained, qualified, and licensed operator ‘connects’ his/her 
vehicle(s) to one or more authorized safety-relevant information service providers. The operator may 
opt for generally-available information (publish-subscribe), or mission-specific information (request-
reply). For the latter, the operator can send the flight plan or intended region of flight along with 
requested information types. In either case, the latest information (which may include a model and a 
forecast) is transmitted by the service provider. Upon receipt, the operator checks the information for 
validity, and then has the opportunity to check for any safety assessment results (e.g., high-risk areas) 
that may cause reconsideration of flight plans or launch window. Once these checks are completed, 
relevant information is loaded onto the vehicle system for use as the basis of on-board monitoring, 
assessment, and mitigation of risk as it evolves during the flight. 
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Such a pre-flight procedure is already being used for some UAS and sUAS operations for limited 
information types and services, and is consistent with the UAS Traffic Management (UTM) concept [5]. 
However, for the envisioned safety assurance system, additional safety-related information services 
would be available and associated service provider functions in operation. 
In-flight – Once vehicle(s) are launched, the operator monitors flight status including risk(s) or other 
observables reported by the vehicle(s) and/or the information service providers. Monitoring functions 
may be executing in parallel at multiple locations: on-board the vehicle(s), at the ground control 
station(s) (GCS), and/or at the service supplier(s)/provider(s).  Most likely each will be operating at 
different rates and with forecasts of different spatial and/or temporal resolutions and time horizons. 
The choice of where monitoring should occur can be based on operational safety requirements for a 
particular domain (i.e., the mission/vehicle/operational environment three-tuple), the risks therein, and 
the bandwidth limits of links between locations. Risk assessment and mitigation functions would be 
implemented in a similar manner. They may execute on-board, at the GCS, and/or at the service 
provider during flight. On-board mitigation options for UAS would consist of automated selection and 
execution of fail-safe contingency maneuvers under certain situations (e.g., hold-in-position, return-to-
launch point, maneuver-to-safe-zone, land immediately, or launch abort). For UAM, an appropriately 
trained operator may be on-board and would also have a role to play in mitigation. 
The above describes a concept with only one human in-the-loop during operations, the operator. This 
person would be responsible for oversight and supervision of one or more vehicles. It is possible that 
other humans will be (at least initially) required to ensure safety. For example, a remote safety pilot may 
be part of the mitigation function under some circumstances. 
Post-flight – After each flight, the primary activity to perform relative to in-time safety assurance is to 
off-load all flight data recorded during the flight. These data, along with any data recorded at the GCS, 
will be uploaded to the relevant service providers to support updating and validating of their services 
and models. Performance anomalies can be reported which may lead to design changes or maintenance 
actions. The operator may also report safety-relevant observations or metadata to help providers 
understand the data and/or the operational context of the flight. This process may be highly automated 
and supported by appropriate tools such that post-flight procedures can be completed in a timely 
manner. Other post-flight activities may include active probing of flight-critical equipment with ground-
based inspection tools to determine any deterioration not sensed during flight. 
To better illustrate the concept of operations, it can be helpful to walk through scenarios that utilize 
these constructs. Use-cases will vary with complexity and boundary conditions, from simple point-to-
point sUAS missions (e.g., the transport of goods/supplies and infrastructure inspection), to complex 
roaming sUAS missions (e.g., emergency/fire response and law enforcement support), to manned UAM 
missions (e.g., air taxi services). As a low-complexity example, the transport of medical specimens from a 
suburban medical office to a large downtown laboratory for testing at a hospital has been used to help 
expose requirements. This scenario is described in [6], and there are similar use-cases that have been 
operationally approved [7][8]. 
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1.3. Urban flight environment hazards and risks 
A set of safety-critical risks to low altitude urban flight were initially identified to help derive information 
requirements, particularly for the Monitoring function. These were selected as a representative set 
based on previous work by NASA and others in industry. They include: flight outside of approved 
airspace; unsafe proximity to air traffic, people on the ground, or property; critical system failures 
(including loss of link, loss or degraded positioning system performance, loss of power, and engine 
failure); loss-of-control due to envelope excursion or flight control system failure; severe weather 
encounters (including wind gusts); security-related risks (cyber or physical); and human factors-related 
risks. The latter includes for example procedural errors of omission/commission that could lead to loss 
of safety margin in the best case or accidents in the worst case. Recent policy by the FAA [9] identifies 
UAS ‘common hazards’ as: technical issues within the UAS, deterioration of external systems supporting 
the UAS, human error, adverse operating conditions, and inability to detect and avoid. Outcomes listed 
in this same policy all involve collisions (e.g. with other aircraft, people on the ground, or infrastructure). 
Although not specific to highly-autonomous low altitude urban flights, there is good agreement between 
those given in the FAA policy and those identified here as initial drivers for in-time safety assurance 
system concept development. 
It should be recognized that the above hazards/risks may not be comprehensive and can involve 
disparate contributing factors as the intended mission, vehicle, and/or environment changes. New 
hazards may also be exposed due to mismatches in vehicle and operational assumptions used during 
design that prove to be invalid (or bounded) during operations; vulnerabilities exist even though the 
system is operating as designed. Hazards of this type (i.e., the unknown unknowns) are particularly 
relevant to the in-time safety assurance concept as it is intended in part to help identify them. There are 
multiple structured processes that have been used in the past to help expose the broadest possible set 
of hazards that may be encountered (e.g., [10] and [11]). In terms of risk assessment for a specific 
application domain and set of assumptions, process guidance is given in [9] (for UAS), and the Safety and 
Operational Risk Assessment (SORA) process can be used as well [12]. Guidance for UAM hazard analysis 
is given in [13]. 
1.4. Scope and approach 
The three topics above determine the scope of the requirements and considerations described herein. 
These are the in-time safety assurance system concept, the application domain, and the set of identified 
safety-critical risks. Within this scope, keep in mind that one purpose of the system concept is to 
identify, track, and predict ‘unknown unknown’ safety risks or hazards (i.e., the discovery of 
vulnerabilities that were not known at design time). Because historically these have occurred due to 
unforeseen combinations, cascades, or contextual dependencies among known safety risks (hazards), 
we believe they will more likely be observable by a system that can look across their indicators. We 
denote this class of observables as precursors, anomalies, and trends (PATs). Of course, the more 
risks/hazards that can be addressed individually, the more likely the unknown unknowns can be 
expected to be detected, assessed, and mitigated in a timely manner by the system. To this end, there 
should be provisions that enable reporting of human observations of unsafe situations/occurrences that 
have developed (e.g., via the Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS), the Aviation Safety Action 
Program (ASAP), and other methods practiced within effective Safety Management Systems (SMS)). 
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The approach taken in this document is to describe the system concept by function and data flow. The 
physical architecture can vary, with the UTM construct and ecosystem used as an example herein and 
for initial testing. Existing systems, processes, and standards are strongly leveraged which will ultimately 
affect the design to some degree. For example, System-Wide Information Management (SWIM) [14], 
SWIM services, evolving UTM services, and the Aviation Safety Information Analysis and Sharing (ASIAS) 
data environment and analytics [15] can be a basis for the envisioned system. More on leveraging 
existing systems and processes is discussed in Sections 2 and 3. 
The organization and representation of information requirements uses existing standards as a template 
or metaphor where possible, since many existing standards/requirements and information services are 
applicable here. In some cases, further research is needed to determine requirements. In these cases, 
we present factors that should be considered when making these determinations. 
1.5. Relevant standards 
The following standards are relevant and may be cited in various parts of this report. Relevance arises 
from the fact that many information services and standards already exist for the domain of commercial 
air transportation. For these, the information types and/or uses overlap, or the processes for exchanging 
and assuring the quality of information can be similar or identical. 
RTCA DO-200B, Standards for Processing Aeronautical Data 
RTCA DO-201B, User Requirements for Navigation Data 
RTCA DO-272D, User Requirements for Aerodrome Mapping Data 
RTCA DO-276C, User Requirements for Terrain and Obstacle Data 
RTCA DO-291C, Exchange Requirements for Terrain, Obstacle, and Mapping Data 
RTCA DO-324, Safety and Performance Requirements (SPR) for Aeronautical Information Services (AIS) 
and Meteorological (MET) Data Link Services 
RTCA DO-349, Architecture Recommendations for Aeronautical Information and MET Data Link Services 
RTCA DO-364, Minimum Aviation System Performance Standards for Aeronautical Information and 
Meteorological Data Link Services 
RTCA DO-369, Guidance for the Usage of Data Linked Wind Information in ATM Operations 
FAA Advisory Circular, AC 00-45H, Aviation Weather Services 
ICAO Annex 3, Meteorological Service for International Air Navigation 
ICAO Annex 15, Aeronautical Information Services 
ISO-9000 series, Quality Management Systems 
ASTM, F3269-17, Standard Practice for Methods to Safely Bound Flight Behavior of Unmanned Aircraft 
Systems Containing Complex Functions 
There are also existing or evolving standards from the European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), 
EUROCONTROL, ARINC, and the Open Geospatial Consortium (OGC) that may be relevant. 
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1.6. Assumptions 
There are two important classes of safety risk management functions that are not directly covered by 
the system concept presented herein. These are related to air traffic (e.g., functions that provide for 
separation assurance) and airspace access (e.g., functions that coordinate and authorize airspace usage). 
We assume that associated safety risks will be covered in part by a set of ATM services and functions 
that can be interoperable with (and complementary to) the services and functions described here. For 
example, ATM functions that enable trajectory-based operations or merging and spacing flow 
sequencing into shared landing sites. An approach to enabling this type of interoperability is part of 
ongoing research based on the UTM ecosystem. 
We also assume there will be a system similar to today’s NAS that can provide some of the required 
information (e.g., AIS, weather, and flight information). This will likely be via SWIM-like services or 3rd-
party services managed by ICAO States, local/municipal governments, or industry. Many such services 
and functions already exist or are in development as part of UTM. These include for example those 
provided by Flight Information Management Systems (FIMS), UAS Service Suppliers (USS), and 
Supplemental Data Service Providers (SDSPs). In subsequent sections we provide more information on 
some of the most relevant of these information sources.  
Per the ConOps described previously, we assume auto-pilot-based flight and as such there may not be a 
remote pilot flying “stick and rudder” as occurs today for many sUAS flights.  However, we also assume 
that there will be at least one human (operator) at a ground location who is responsible for overseeing 
and supervising flights. This individual will be able to issue high-level commands such as uploading a new 
flight plan or sending an emergency land command. Further, a single individual may remotely oversee 
multiple air vehicles simultaneously. This change of role and responsibility of human(s) during 
operations will lead to derived requirements for effective interfaces, procedures, and training. We 
assume that the architecture and information requirements presented herein are sufficient to design 
these interfaces, procedures, and training. This is also assumed for UAM operations where there may be 
an onboard operator/pilot with limited traditional piloting skills or training. 
We assume that some ‘connected’ urban infrastructure can and will exist (e.g., [16]), and some elements 
of this infrastructure may be designed and used for purposes other than to support aviation; hence 
requiring more attention to data quality when using this infrastructure as a data source. Finally, in order 
to achieve the full potential of the system concept, we assume some sharing of information among and 
across operators, manufacturers, and safety assurance service suppliers will be possible; and that this 
sharing can be done while protecting intellectual property and privacy (e.g., by de-identifying or 
otherwise anonymizing source data). 
2. Architecture 
A high-level functional view of the system concept is shown in Figure 1 and Figure 2, which are derived 
from [1] and [2], respectively. The three functions (monitor, assess, mitigate) can be applied within 
several architectural paradigms including the overarching National Airspace System (NAS) architecture 
and the evolving approach to SWIM [14]. Ultimately, design decisions regarding the allocation of 
functions across architectural elements (and locations), as well as how they can perform in a 
coordinated manner remains a subject of research. However, there are a set of principles and traits that 
should be adhered to when making these decisions. These are discussed below. 
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2.1. Guiding Principles and Overarching Traits 
Decomposition of the high-level functions (into sub-functions) can take many forms and remain 
effective both in terms of performance and information requirements. This is also true of (a) the 
distribution of functions onto physical computing elements at the various locations; and (b) the various 
possible assignments of role and authority given to human(s) in the system (e.g., the ability to intervene 
and ‘take-over’ to mitigate risk in some situations). Based on the decades-long evolution of safety 
assurance best-practices for commercial airline-like operations, the following are some of the principles 
and traits we recommend when considering the architectural design space. 
1. Service-oriented; scalable; building block approach 
2. Open and extendible to address new risks or hazards as/if they are discovered 
3. Leverages and interoperates with existing relevant systems, including SWIM and ANSP services 
4. Transformative from the existing NAS; with a practical transition path 
5. Applies techniques that assure appropriate levels of data/information integrity 
6. Applies run-time assurance/verification (RTA/RTV) techniques (see Section 3.3 and Section 4) 
7. Supports isolation of flight-critical functions onboard to meet higher fail-safe assurance levels 
8. Supports techniques that can bound the behavior of non-deterministic functions (see Section 4)  
9. Data and service providers can be authorized/certificated as ‘trusted source’ 
10. Minimizes exposure to cyber threats (e.g., by minimizing in-flight exchanges of critical data) 
11. Data exchanges are protected and link agnostic (as long as meeting quality requirements) 
12. Provides mechanisms that can protect sensitive data (e.g., de-identification) 
13. Combines SWIM-like connectivity/services with ASIAS-like analytics and processes 
14. Applies design assurance methods for flight-critical elements (e.g., auto-mitigate functions) 
15. Supports current SMS processes; including reporting of system failures back to designers 
16. Provides an incremental step to the IASMS concept described by the National Academies [2] 
Fortunately, many of these principles and traits are also intrinsic to the design and evolution of the 
National Airspace System (NAS), which includes for example UTM and SWIM. 
For initial development and testing, a UTM-like ecosystem has been used [5]. Within this ecosystem, 
instances of the three high-level functions may exist at various locations (e.g., at the service 
provider(s)/supplier(s), at the GCS, and on-board). To begin to evaluate this design space and to check 
for compatibility with existing UTM service concepts, three locations have been used for initial testing 
(Figure 3). Within this architecture, three end-to-end services have been tested, as have several 
monitoring and assessment sub-functions. More details on this work and the underlying architecture are 
provided in Section 2.3 and in Appendices A, B, and F. 
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Figure 1. Functional elements and flow of information for an IASMS (as shown in [2]) 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Functional elements and flow of information for an in-time safety assurance system 
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Figure 3. In-time safety assurance functions applied within the UTM ecosystem for initial testing [5][6] 
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As will be described in Section 3, many information elements (and parameters) relevant to the in-time 
safety assurance system concept are already part of these services. In some cases, the content may 
require extension, while the underlying exchange protocol may be applicable (e.g., low altitude winds in 
urban areas). In addition, new SWIM services are becoming available to support specific needs of UAS 
operations. 
Similar to SWIM, the ASIAS program (also referred to as the ASIAS system) collects and manages a large 
amount of operational data. But the types of data are different, as is the availability and intended use. 
The ASIAS program connects nearly 200 information sources from across government, industry, and the 
community, archives data from these sources, and then uses these data to monitor known risks, detect 
emerging risks, and evaluate the effectiveness of mitigations [15]. The correspondence with the aims of 
the system concept presented in this document is direct; with the primary differences being the 
method, the cycle time, and the operator community. The ASIAS-based method requires significant 
human involvement (e.g., subject matter experts) and ranges from months to years to complete the 
monitor-assess-mitigate cycle. This is largely because mitigations typically require changes to designs, 
policy, or training/maintenance. In contrast, the ‘in-time’ safety assurance concept presented here aims 
to shorten this significantly (e.g., a few seconds to a few hours) for some types of hazards or 
vulnerabilities. Both concepts aim to be proactive in terms of identifying PATs before accidents occur. 
Contributors to ASIAS include the FAA plus more than 40 airline operators, many business jet operators, 
aircraft manufacturers, and maintenance/repair organizations. The resulting information covers 
approximately 99% of all U.S. air carrier commercial operations. There is no corresponding coverage of 
UAS operations (or urban UAS operations). However, there is an industry activity underway considering 
the efficacy and methods for creating a similar program for UAS [17]. Of the many information sources 
used by ASIAS, the following can be either directly utilized by the envisioned system concept, or can 
serve as a model or framework for a complementary capability for urban UAS (or UAM) operations of 
the future. 
 ASAP (Aviation Safety Action Program) 
 ATSAP (Air Traffic Safety Action Program) 
 ASRS (Aviation Safety Reporting System) 
 FOQA (Flight Operational Quality Assurance) 
 LOSA (Line Operations Safety Audit) and M-LOSA (Maintenance LOSA) 
 METARs and MORs (Meteorological Aviation Reports; Mandatory Occurrence Reports) 
 NFDC (National Flight Data Center) 
FOQA [18] is particularly relevant to the safety assurance system concept described in Section 1, as it 
covers the routine collection and analysis of flight data pertaining to individual flights as well as 
aggregated across many flights. Flight data are recorded onboard during flight, then off-loaded after 
flight. Over 200 parameters are recorded regarding the state of the aircraft and onboard systems. In 
terms of finding systemic issues that require mitigation, aggregation of data across flights has proven to 
be of greater value than analysis of single flights. Aggregated data allow analysts (as well as assessment 
tools) to look for trends and patterns. For example, [18] discusses how excessive descent rates can be 
identified across the fleet for a particular airport. This would perhaps suggest a change to the approach 
procedure at that airport. One important aspect of FOQA is the process for de-identification and 
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protection of data. Without assurances of these traits, sharing across the industry would not be 
possible. 
Some UAS operators and manufacturers do retain and analyze flight data logs; however, nothing on the 
scale of FOQA exists. Such a capability would be ideal to support the Monitoring and Assessment 
functions of the safety system described in Section 1, particularly as/if the number of operations grows. 
The parameter set is well defined and many are the same as would be needed for urban sUAS 
operations and UAM (e.g., aircraft position, heading, and velocity). Although it is desirable to get some 
flight data in ‘real-time’ (via wireless link); off-loading post-flight can support some of the envisioned 
monitoring and assessment functions. In addition, it is likely that some of the tools used by FOQA for 
managing large-scale information sets and analyzing these sets to look for vulnerabilities (e.g., PATs) 
may be translatable to ‘in-time’ highly automated settings and cycle times. 
In summary, although not operating in ‘real-time’, ASIAS offers many correspondences to the 
information needs and functions embodied by the system concept presented in this document. These 
should be leveraged as much as possible as development progresses. 
2.3. Architecture Supporting Initial Testing 
Figure 4 illustrates the architecture used for concept exploration and preliminary testing within a UTM 
ecosystem. For this instantiation, an initial set of in-time safety assurance services were defined as were 
two types of Supplemental Data Service Providers (SDSPs), a research Ground Control Station (GCS), and 
a test aircraft hosting an onboard research platform. Using this architecture, representative physical, 
logical, and functional designs were tested to support requirements exposure and validation during this 
phase of R&D. These tests are discussed further in Section 6, as well as in the Appendices. 
 
Figure 4. Architecture used for developmental testing 
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Several terms and acronyms are used in Figure 4 to label architectural elements. These are defined 
below. Additional details can be found in Appendix A and B. 
 Multi-Service Provider. In UTM, Supplemental Data Service Providers (SDSPs) may be providers 
of individual services or multiple services. In the test architecture, we wanted to evaluate both 
types of providers. Here two services are combined in terms of information exchange with the 
UAS ground station. 
o BP, Battery Prognostics service 
o PtT, Proximity to Threat service 
 NPCRA, Non-Participant Casualty Risk Assessment service (single-service provider) 
 RFI, Radio Frequency Interference service 
o Utilizes information provided by the RFI OS&N (Observation Stations and Network) 
 NavQ, Navigation System Quality service 
o Utilizes information provided by the NavQ OS&N 
Urban Infrastructure and Ground-based Elements 
The two OS&N elements allow for testing and evaluation to determine the efficacy of using urban 
infrastructure to help to reduce risk associated with hazards in the flight environment (i.e., supporting 
better Monitoring and Assessment functionality). More specifically, in-situ observations of the RF 
environment at relevant frequencies can be used for model validation/updates and to see in-time 
disturbances that may lead to loss of link if continuing on the same flight plan or trajectory. 
Similarly, utilizing GPS or other navigation system receiver observables from appropriately positioned 
stations within the urban area can help to validate predictive models regarding navigation system 
performance (e.g., with respect to assumptions of multi-path effects at low altitudes). An added benefit 
of access to GPS observables from a network of receivers is the potential to apply ‘corrections’ that 
remove common errors (e.g., due to atmospheric attenuation); this could enable a form of differential 
GPS to be applied to improve performance [19]. Lastly, a NavQ service can leverage and provide data 
from terrestrial-based Alternate Positioning, Navigation, and Timing (APNT) system(s) that may be 
available in urban areas. For this testing, two such APNT system were implemented and are being 
evaluated as part of this service: LocataTM [20] and NextNavTM [21]. 
Although not tested here, the OS&N concept can also be used to provide weather observables within 
urban areas (e.g., winds, temperature, and visibility) similar to the way Automated Weather Observing 
Systems (AWOS) work at commercial airports [22]. This capability would likely be required for UAM 
verti-ports where all-weather operations are desired. 
NASA’s version of a UAS Service Supplier (USS) was used to test interoperability with UTM as well as to 
access inherent safety-related assurance capabilities provided by UTM elements such as air traffic and 
airspace management functions. Although not tested to date, this would include functions like provided 
by the Low Altitude Authorization and Notification Capability (LAANC) service [23] and other FIMS or 
USS services (which in turn may provide connectivity to SWIM services). Further, the USS may provide 
USS-specific data products applicable to the envisioned safety assurance system functions. Some have 
suggested combining GCS and USS functions, USS/SDSP connectivity, and direct USS-to-vehicle 
communications during flights. These concepts were not tested but are supported by the architecture. 
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In terms of information exchange between the ground-based elements, a web-based JSON protocol is 
used (see Figure 5 and [24]). This is consistent with prior work as well as the approach taken by industry 
(and the FAA) for similar UTM-based systems. The specific protocol used during testing was designed in 
consultation with UTM developers who had employed similar protocols in their tests. As will be 
discussed in a later Section, there are existing aviation-specific information exchange standards that 
utilize UML/XML [25]; and SWIM exchange protocols apply these standards. However, JSON-based 
protocols seem to be evolving as an equivalent and acceptable alternative. At this point, either option 
will suffice for the system concept presented here.   
 
 
Figure 5. Information exchange protocol used for initial testing [25] 
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safety assurance functions and sub-functions are at various levels of maturity and will mature at 
different rates going forward as the research progresses. 
Among other things, cFS allows independently-executing functions to access a common virtual ‘shared’ 
information bus. More specifically, the framework coordinates bus access and enforces memory access 
permissions so that functions may read or write information to this bus with little overhead, much like 
‘apps’ interface to cloud-based data storage. cFS has matured over many years and is in widespread use 
across many domains where real-time OS performance can be mission- and safety-critical. As such, it 
provides the stable and robust platform we require for conducting R&D on each of the envisioned 
functions, as well as the aggregate system-of-systems aimed at in-time safety assurance. For example, 
we can create an asynchronous ‘app’ associated with each of the monitoring sub-functions mentioned 
previously, as well as for any automated or autonomous assessment and mitigation functions we may 
want to evaluate. This also allows each ‘app’ to be designed to unique data quality requirements (DQRs), 
design assurance levels (DALs), data processing assurance levels (DPALs), and/or Specific Assurance and 
Integrity Levels (SAILs) [29][30][12]. 
 
Figure 6. Platform for testing onboard functions using CoreFlight System [6][27][28] 
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The ‘Constraint Monitoring’ function is based on a capability originally conceived and implemented as 
Safeguard [33][34]. Safeguard was designed to be an independent highly assured system that warns 
(either the autopilot or a remote pilot) of impending violations of geo-spatial constraints (e.g., stay-in or 
stay-out areas). Here, the Constraint Monitor function is a more general-purpose independent monitor 
that can watch for impending violations of these constraints as well as other operator-specified or ATM-
defined constraints. These include for example airspace restrictions, range limits, path deviations, 
envelope excursions, terrain/obstacle separation, and altitude/airspeed restrictions. Predicted violations 
can trigger actions by the remote operator, contingency management functions, and/or auto-mitigation 
functions (including the auto-pilot/flight controller). This function can also provide a form of behavioral 
bounding such as described in [35]. As such, flight controller non-determinism can be constrained and 
enable learning of safe limits of behavior. As long as this function is an independent system and highly-
assured, it can be the ‘teacher’ in this regard; mitigating the risk of non-deterministic behavior. 
The on-board architecture shown in Figure 6 was selected based on the guidelines and principles laid 
out earlier in this section; while also allowing for investigation of the trade-offs regarding on-board ‘in-
time’ monitoring, assessment, and mitigation of risk versus ground-based versus a mix of both. 
Preliminary testing involves two forms of safety/risk assessment functions and both are designed to 
execute on-board as well as off-board (see Appendix B). Findings from these tests are to be published, 
including characterizing the efficacy of these two and other on-line assessment methods. 
3. Information Requirements 
Given an in-time safety assurance concept that applies ‘big-data,’ data-driven, and model-based 
predictive capabilities, the more high-quality and relevant data that can be accessible as inputs to the 
system, the greater the potential for the system to reduce risk. This is particularly true when trying to 
identify PATs that can result from unforeseen or unexpected condition combinations or cascades. This is 
a lesson-learned over decades, and applied today in SMS [3] and ASIAS [15] for commercial air 
transport-category operations. However, as with ASIAS, there may be challenges with integrating across 
heterogeneous data sets as well as with sharing some types of data across manufacturers, operators, 
and those who develop/manage infrastructure systems. Exacerbating this issue for emerging urban 
operations is the likelihood that some infrastructure and services may not be designed specifically to 
support aviation and meeting aviation system performance standards (e.g., urban environment 
monitoring systems). 
 
In addition, some information classes or parameters may not be required for some application domains 
(i.e., mission/vehicle types and flight environments). For example, urban sUAS missions and vehicles are 
expected to be very diverse, as are the flight profiles; whereas UAM operations are likely to be more 
homogeneous. Risk assessments such as SORA can help to determine the scope of information required 
for specific missions/vehicles and flight environments. 
 
With this in mind, below we discuss the span of considerations that are relevant in order to provide the 
data inputs to the envisioned safety assurance system (i.e., the far left box of Figure 2). 
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3.1. Content and Classes 
A set of 16 classes of information has been identified that can enable the Monitoring and Assessment 
functions envisioned for the in-time safety assurance system and the selected application domain. This 
set spans a broad range of observables related to known safety risks, while also allowing for tailoring to 
user/operator preferences and risk tolerance. It is recognized that several issues (such as described 
above) may hinder or otherwise affect the availability of some of these classes or parameters. However, 
as mentioned previously, the in-time safety assurance system ConOps and architecture are scalable, and 
in this case, can be scaled to utilize the information available; keeping in mind that with less data, there 
will be reduced capability to identify and mitigate some classes of vulnerabilities (e.g., PATs). 
 
The set of identified information classes are shown in Figure 7. Parameters within these classes follow in 
Table 1. For many entries in the table, there are existing relevant standards (which may or may not need 
to be revised) and existing sources, services, or capabilities that may be extendible to provide the 
information. For classes marked with a (*), external environment data is needed at a minimum for the 
launch site(s). It is desirable to also have data for landing site(s) and for locations or volumes within the 
urban area and near planned flight route(s). Metadata requirements are described separately (see 3.3). 
 
 
 
Figure 7. Information classes relevant to in-time safety assurance functions 
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Table 1. Information classes and parameters. 
Info Class Parameters 
Aircraft State 
 
 
Position (latitude, longitude, altitude) 
Attitude (pitch, roll, yaw) 
Heading 
Track 
Airspeed 
Groundspeed 
Vertical speed 
Acceleration (x,y,z) 
Flight-critical system states (incl. flight controller state and auto-pilot mode) 
Geo-spatial Constraints* 
 
 
Airspace boundaries (e.g., Classes A-G) 
No-fly zones (e.g., Temporary Flight Restrictions (TFRs)) 
Obstacles (type, location, extent) 
Vertical structures (some may also be Obstacles) 
Terrain (Area 2, 3, and 4, See [41][43]) 
Operator-defined geofenced areas (e.g., Stay-in regions) 
Weather* 
 
 
Wind speed and direction 
Visibility 
Air Temperature 
Barometric pressure 
Precipitation 
Relative humidity 
Cloud ceiling 
Forecast model – Weather forecast database or model with set (or subset) of 
weather parameters above and for a defined coverage volume and time 
window (See MET/WIXM information types [25]) 
Population density* 
 
 
Person position observables (e.g., from camera-based technologies) 
Person position reports (e.g., from cell phone-based applications) 
Forecast model – Population density database or model with estimated 
#people in each cell of an (x,y) grid across a defined coverage area and for 
defined time epochs (preferably correlated with 2/3-D building footprints) 
Link performance* 
(at relevant frequencies) 
 
 
Signal strength observables (e.g., RSSI) 
Channel occupancy rate 
Message drop count and type 
Forecast model – Link performance database or model with set (or subset) of 
parameters above and for a defined coverage volume and time window 
Nav performance* 
 
 
GPS receiver observables (e.g., DOPs, SVs) (ephemerides) 
INS/IMU observables 
Magnetometer (or other magvar measure) 
Augmentation system corrections (if available) 
Alternate nav system observables (if available) 
Forecast model – Navigation system performance database or model with set 
(or subset) of parameters above and for a defined coverage volume and time 
window 
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Power system 
performance 
 
 
Battery voltage (each pack) 
Battery current (each pack) 
Battery temperature (each pack) 
Battery model (derived from calibration procedure) (each pack) 
 
Engine/motor 
performance 
 
 
Vibration level (each motor) 
Temperature (each motor) 
Rotor current (each motor) 
Engine/motor model (derived from calibration procedure) (each motor) 
 
Aerodynamic model 
 
 
Information to develop initial model and flight data to validate or otherwise 
improve the model (see Appendix D) 
 
Airspace conformance 
 
 
 
Authorizations (e.g., as if from LAANC) 
Airspace-related warnings (e.g., from ATM/ANSP/USS) 
ATC communications (if available) 
Air traffic 
 
 
Identification and location reports (e.g., ADS-B/Remote ID or radar-based) 
Intended flight plan 
Schedule information (e.g., departure/arrival and waypoint slot times) 
Air traffic-related constraints (e.g., procedures and restrictions) 
Air traffic-relate warnings (e.g., from ATM/ANSP/USS) 
 
ANSP infrastructure 
(AIS) 
 
 
 
 
Airport/heliport/vertiport locations (see [42]) 
Airport/heliport/vertiport feature information (see [42]) 
ANSP infrastructure availability and status (e.g., NOTAMs of outages) 
Augmentation systems availability and status (e.g., GBAS, SBAS, LOCD-IN) 
Alternate nav systems availability and status 
See AIS/AIXM information types [25][36][41] 
 
Human performance 
 
 
 
 
Communications (voice/text between participants) 
Participant inputs (e.g., operator commands sent to vehicle) 
Time on duty (of each participant) 
Training recency and history (of each participant) 
Direct physio measures; eye-tracking; workload measures 
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Safety reports 
 
 
ASRS reports (updated for UAM and urban UAS) 
ASAP/ATSAP reports (updated for UAM and urban UAS) 
MORS/PIREPS (updated for UAM and urban UAS) 
Error and failure logs for equipment and functions 
Maintenance logs (incl. age/history of critical components) 
 
Configuration settings 
 
 
 
User or operator-defined risk tolerance (e.g., thresholds, safety margins) 
User or operator-define constraints (e.g., geo-fences, speed limits) 
User or operator input of vehicle specs (incl. MTBF estimates) 
Contingency policies (e.g., if loss of link, trigger auto-pilot LAND mode) 
Flight plan 
 
Flight plan waypoints (incl. ETA or airspeed at waypoints) 
Flight plan mode changes 
Takeoff and landing info (e.g., descent and climb rates) 
 
 
3.2. Models and Databases 
One of the most desirable traits of the system concept is to provide predictive capability. Models and/or 
databases for some classes of information can help to enable this capability. Further, because of the 
‘big-data’ data-driven approach, model validation and quality can improve over time. Model updates 
can be based on flight data from previous flights as well as data provided by observation stations within 
the region of flight. As a result, predictive uncertainty can reduce by closing the gap between the 
validation domain and the application domain for each model [37]. Based on prior similar work and the 
expected short duration of flights in this domain, it is anticipated that model exchanges do not need to 
occur during flights. Instead, exchange is needed as part of a pre-flight procedure and checklist, to check 
for model updates and ‘load’ the latest version(s) into the operational system. Similarly, the post-flight 
procedure should allow for forwarding relevant data back to model designers and service providers (see 
Figures 1, 2, and 4). 
Ten types of models (or databases) are envisioned as supportive of the concept (see Table 1). 
 Aircraft aerodynamic model 
 Geo-spatial feature model (including terrain and obstacles) 
 Weather forecast model* 
 Population density model* 
 Link performance model* 
 GNC system performance model (incl. Nav Quality model*) 
 Battery performance model 
 Engine performance model 
 Power estimation model 
 Mean time between failure (MTBF) models (for critical components) 
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For highly autonomous low altitude urban flight, there are R&D challenges for some of these model 
types (see examples in Appendix A); however, there are efforts underway to address them by industry, 
academia, and government agencies. More details on aerodynamic modeling are given in Appendix D. 
The model types above with the (*) could benefit from having a common representation in a spatio-
temporal reference frame. In other words, estimates or predicted (forecast) values of parameters may 
be provided at (x, y, z, t) increments over a user-specified range. This is the approach used for some 
existing weather products and SWIM services [38][39]. For the models noted above to be useful to 
safety assurance during low-altitude urban flight operations, it is to be determined appropriate values 
for horizontal/vertical resolution (i.e., cell size), forecast horizon (or look-ahead time), and forecast 
resolution. This issue and other information quality issues are addressed further below. 
 
3.3. Quality 
Well-defined quality procedures facilitate effective data exchange by allowing data producers to clearly 
specify the quality of the data produced, and by allowing data users to determine the extent to which 
the data meets their requirements. Data quality should be achieved and maintained in accordance with 
DO-200B, “Standards for Processing Aeronautical Data” [29]. This standard covers all aspects of quality 
management and has been successfully applied in commercial aviation for decades, with revisions twice 
over this timeframe to accommodate the new types of data and information services used in aviation 
systems over the intervening years. 
As described in DO-200B [29]: 
 Data Quality is defined as the degree or level of confidence that the data provided meets the 
requirements of the user of the data. 
 Each data user has the responsibility to define his/her data quality requirements based on the 
intended use of the data. 
 Quality requirements cover both the processing and management of data throughout the 
‘aeronautical data chain’; this chain includes all exchanges from data origination to end use. 
 DQRs are described using seven quality characteristics or traits: (1) Accuracy, (2) Resolution, (3) 
Assurance Level, (4) Traceability, (5) Timeliness, (6) Completeness, and (7) Format. 
As stated in [29], “The degree that a data element meets the data quality requirements determines its 
fitness for the intended use.” Data processing requirements, including data protections/security, are 
also covered in this standard. 
Some relevant quality standards have been established by ICAO and should be sufficient for the domain 
considered here. For example, [40] provides accuracy recommendations for weather observations and 
forecasts. Examples relevant to low altitude urban flight include: mean surface wind (direction, +/- 10 
deg; speed, +/- 0.5 m/s (1 kt) to 5 m/s (10 kts), +/- 10% above 5 m/s (10 kts)); visibility (+/- 50 m up to 
600 m); runway visual range (i.e., visibility at the surface) (+/- 10 m up to 400 m); air temperature (+/- 1 
deg C); and pressure value (+/- 0.5 hPa). Other relevant examples of numerical quality requirements can 
be found in [41], which covers geo-spatial features such as would be provided on charts or in databases 
used by flight systems. Examples include terrain data (horizontal accuracy of 5 m; vertical accuracy of 3 
m), obstacle data (horizontal accuracy of 5 m; vertical accuracy of 3 m), and heliport feature data 
(horizontal accuracy of 0.5 m; vertical accuracy of 0.5 m). Geo-fencing boundaries (i.e., no-fly zones) can 
apply the requirements specified for similar polygonal features at airports (e.g., horizontal accuracy 
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requirement is 1 m for apron boundaries and construction areas). These and other relevant numerical 
requirements for quality can also be found in RTCA and EUROCAE standards (e.g., [42][43][44]). 
Because the system concept aims to provide a level of safety assurance, data integrity can be a critical 
characteristic that will either enable or constrain the degree to which risk to safety can be mitigated. In 
terms of existing quality standards, data integrity is considered part of the Assurance Level characteristic 
(e.g., DPAL value) [29]. Any data element (or parameter) that is an input to a flight-critical function 
should have a high DPAL associated with it. Further, for higher DPALs, additional processes and methods 
must be employed to assure the data has not been altered or otherwise corrupted prior to end-use. In 
other words, the data must come from a trusted source and be trustworthy. DO-200B provides guidance 
on processes to utilize to achieve various DPALs. In addition, there are system/technological approaches 
that can employed as needed, such as applying redundant or dissimilar data sources, cyber-security 
protection mechanisms (e.g., [45]), and RTA/RTV techniques (e.g., [46]-[50]). A general framework for 
information management aimed at achieving data integrity is described in [51]. In this framework, a 
span of design intervention options are described that can be applied depending on the required 
integrity level. These options include for example augmentation services and techniques such as are 
employed for navigation systems today [52][53][54]. The framework also considers the role humans can 
play with regard to data integrity assurance. 
Quality becomes particularly important for predictive functions (e.g., trajectory prediction) and 
functions that combine outputs of other functions (e.g., assessments across hazard monitors). In these 
cases, care must be taken to identify and understand how the quality of all the input data can affect the 
quality of derived measures and analytic tool products. This process we denote as uncertainty 
management and is discussed further in the next section. 
4. Uncertainty Management 
Within the holistic view of a safety assurance system, consideration of uncertainty management (UM) is 
essential, particularly for in-time predictive capabilities. Information and operational data are collected 
through both sensor networks and autonomous functions, each of which can suffer from resolution 
limitations, noise, and external forces like environmental conditions. The latter are intrinsically 
uncertain, being driven by complex physical phenomena that are difficult to predict in complex domains 
(e.g., wind tunneling effects in urban canyons [55]). Moreover, the variety of vehicle types and mission 
profiles expected during the low-altitude operations (e.g., [4][5][56][57]) requires UM methods that can 
accommodate heterogeneous vehicle performance, un-modeled events and effects, and adjust 
predictions accordingly. Appendix C describes a generic framework for UM focused on identification of 
uncertainty sources, specifically for in-time vehicle tracking and monitoring, and a formal method for 
uncertainty quantification (UQ). Generally speaking, UQ encompasses the study of uncertainties in input 
parameters as well as those derived from design simplifications that can affect the output or response of 
a process or function. An important facet of UQ is the proper characterization and treatment of input 
uncertainties. This characterization and treatment of input uncertainties is part of UM. Because of the 
span and diversity of information types that may be used by in-time safety assurance systems, a 
structured approach or framework for UM is essential. 
Input parameter uncertainties can be divided into two classes: aleatoric and epistemic uncertainty [37].  
Aleatoric uncertainty is the inherent variation associated with a parameter and is often referred to as 
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irreducible or stochastic uncertainty. An example of aleatoric uncertainties are sensor measurements. 
Sensor manufacturers often provide an accuracy specification as an estimate of the uncertainty to be 
expected when using a particular sensor (e.g., mean value, standard deviation, and probability 
distribution function). This type of uncertainty can also be quantified by users to some extent through a 
calibration or benchmarking process. Aleatoric uncertainties exist on other quality characteristics as well 
(e.g., timeliness; which includes update rate and latency). In contrast, epistemic uncertainty results from 
imperfect knowledge or ignorance of the behavior of a system, function, or process that produces a 
parameter or value. These can often be identified and accounted for through effective verification and 
validation processes, and then appropriate process controls as data is generated over time during 
operations and more is learned regarding system behavior in various contexts. RTA/RTV techniques in 
particular can help to identify and reduce epistemic uncertainty once a system has become operational 
(e.g., [46]-[50]). With respect to the potential for non-deterministic behavior (e.g., as may be associated 
with complex autonomous functions), a ‘simplex’ architectural approach can be used to manage or 
bound this type of epistemic uncertainty [58][59]. This approach is employed for example by the 
conformance monitor design described in [33] and [34]. A good UM framework must recognize that 
both types of uncertainties (aleatoric and epistemic) can occur and provide for a means of propagating 
them into a measure or bound on predictive uncertainty. More details on this complex issue can be 
found in [37]. 
To date, for risk assessment functions we have applied a generalized point-collocation non-intrusive 
polynomial chaos expansion (PCE) method as part of an underlying UM framework (Appendix C).  
Polynomial chaos is a surrogate modeling technique based on a spectral representation of uncertainty.  
This approach allows for the generation of uncertainty estimates without modification to underlying 
source code of the process or function being modeled.  In addition, estimates for sensitivities and 
confidence intervals can be found analytically without significant increase in computational costs. 
Sensitivity estimates discovered by application of this method can guide future research and resource 
investments (e.g., re-design of function or acquisition of better sensors). These can then drive down the 
overall uncertainty in the assessment and prediction of safety risk.  Also, the estimation of confidence 
intervals can give insight into the non-determinism of predictions. These models are extremely 
computationally efficient in comparison to traditional UQ approaches such as Monte Carlo simulation. 
The PCE methodology is initially being applied to different (3-DoF and 6-DoF) off-nominal trajectory and 
impact point predictive models to better understand the input parameter sensitivities for parameters 
such as heading, ground speed, wind velocity, wind direction, roll, pitch, and yaw at varying altitudes. 
One initial goal is to identify a ceiling altitude where the 3-DoF modeling estimations can be sufficient 
for pre-flight risk assessment. The analysis will also help identify sensitive input parameters where 
additional testing and/or enhanced sensors or instrumentation might be beneficial. More on this 
element and the underlying framework is provided in Appendix C. 
5. Exchange Model and Protocols 
The Aeronautical Information Exchange Model (AIXM) [25] enables the management and exchange of 
aeronautical information and has generally been adopted for future aviation-related information 
support systems. The current version includes for example airport/heliport information, airspace 
structures, waypoints, navigation aids, arrival/departure procedures, routes, and flight restrictions. 
AIXM is one of a family of conceptual data models developed by the FAA and EUROCONTROL to 
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facilitate global interoperability and information exchange.  Two others are the Weather Information 
Exchange Model (WXXM) and the Flight Information Exchange Model (FIXM). WXXM enables 
interoperable meteorological information exchange. FIXM facilitates the exchange of flight schedules 
and flow information in a globally standardized format. The Aerodrome Mapping Exchange Model 
(AMXM) was developed specifically to support applications of aerodrome (i.e., airport) mapping data. 
Collectively, these models enable platform-independent information collection, dissemination, and 
transformation through the data chain to the end-user or system. Further, the content and quality 
standards previously mentioned were used as the basis for these models. Each consists of a conceptual 
model of the information domain and an XML encoding schema. The conceptual model catalogs the 
features and properties of the information using the Unified Modeling Language (UML).  The XML 
encoding schema allows exchange of the information in digital XML format. This format is similar to the 
JSON format previously discussed and used for the preliminary testing within the UTM ecosystem.  
AIXM includes nearly 300 features, or classes of aeronautical information, many of which are relevant to 
low altitude urban operations. Each feature/class is broken down into attributes and associations (e.g., a 
runway has a surface type associated). Each association in turn can have further associations. Thus many 
layers of information can be defined. AIXM was developed to be extensible to meet the needs of a 
community of interest or application domain. This can be done by either extending the core classes to 
include new attributes and/or associations, or by defining new classes. For example, consider the AIXM 
feature class ‘Airport/Heliport’ [25]. This feature class comprises 11 associated features and 26 
attributes. Examples of the associated features include the TouchDownLiftoff point, the Apron area, and 
RulesProcedures that apply. Examples of attributes include fieldElevation, transitionAltitude, and 
whether it is for privateUse. This class could be extended/adapted to model required UAM vertiport 
information which should be similar. This is the recommended approach for the new domain in general 
(i.e., build on top of the existing exchange models – extending relevant feature classes, attributes, and 
associations; and creating new classes as needed). 
As with the testing performed to date, data exchange can be instantiated through AIXM-like feature 
services such as the OGC Web Feature Service, which enables the direct provision AIXM features 
[25][60]. Other relevant standards and exchange models can be found in [61][62][63]. As discussed, 
there are many correspondences with SWIM and where possible, SWIM feeds should be leveraged. This 
is another reason why a common and accepted exchange model is recommended for the new domain. 
Lastly, we envision primarily request-reply type communications. Pre-flight communication between 
operator(s) and service provider(s) would consist of requests for the latest information available 
(current and forecast). Further, if contract-based, these exchanges may be automated to improve 
efficiency. Operators would then load onto the aircraft relevant data as part of setup. In-flight 
exchanges between the aircraft and the GCS (and perhaps directly with service providers) would be 
limited and would primarily encompass aircraft systems state information sent to the GCS (or service 
provider) via a telemetry link. Post-flight exchanges would involve off-loading data recorded onboard 
and sending relevant elements back to service providers (or designers) for quality improvement and for 
analysis regarding PATs that may only be identifiable by looking across many flights. Because both XML 
and JSON are bandwidth inefficient, binary encoding (e.g., MavLink [64]) may be needed for some of 
these exchanges. The above approach is the one we used for the test architecture described in Section 
2.3 and Figures 4 to 6, and for the preliminary testing summarized below and later in Appendix F. 
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6. Supporting Tests 
Several tests were conducted during 2018-2019 with the following objectives: 
 Expose and validate requirements 
 Evaluate the efficacy and feasibility of the envisioned information system 
 Demonstrate interoperability (and compatibility) within a UTM ecosystem 
 Collect data to support R&D of on-line analytics tools (e.g., for anomaly detection) 
 Verification and technology maturation for selected elements 
 Inform decisions regarding R&D priorities and plans going forward 
For these tests, the architectural principles and constructs described in Section 2 and illustrated in 
Figures 4-6 were applied (e.g., a UTM-based ecosystem was used as a basis). Two sets of the tests were 
simulation-based and two sets were flight test-based using sUAS platforms. Simulation testing occurred 
at NASA Ames Research Center using two different simulation facilities, tailored somewhat to urban 
sUAS operations and UAM operations, respectively. Flight tests were conducted at NASA Langley 
Research Center using the City Environment for Range Testing of Autonomous Integrated Navigation 
(CERTAIN) and multiple sUAS aircraft equipped as shown in Figure 6. During the flight tests, the system 
spanned and connected SDSP servers and the USS at NASA Ames with aircraft, GCSs, and an SDSP server 
operating at NASA Langley. More details on these supporting tests are provided in Appendix F. 
7. Related Industry Developments 
Within the target domain there are relatively few commercial operations today. UAM is still in a concept 
development stage, although some in industry are working aggressively to achieve operational 
capability in the near-term (e.g., [4]). As an initial step, reference vehicle designs have emerged and are 
being developed (e.g., [65]). As for safety assessments, at least one company has published results of a 
failure modes and effects analysis [66]. In contrast, sUAS flights have become somewhat ubiquitous with 
many manufacturers of aircraft and developers of supporting systems. However, due in part to safety 
concerns, operations typically avoid flight over people and urban areas, particularly at night or in bad 
weather conditions. Most also involve a remote pilot and remain in visual line-of-sight of this pilot 
and/or visual observer(s). However, there are many existing industry products and systems that are 
used for sUAS operations or related fields that can be leveraged to help achieve the envisioned safety 
assurance functions. Some were discussed in prior sections; additional examples are given below. 
GCS software and mobile ‘apps’ support sUAS operators in the field for configuration, flight planning, 
tracking, command and control, and data recording/analysis. Most of these connect to a network and 
data is routinely and automatically returned to the manufacturer or service provider(s) to support 
product improvement. Connections may occur during pre-flight, in-flight, and/or post-flight, and various 
commercial links and networks are used to make these connections. Some products also provide access 
to services like those alluded to here as needed for safety assurance (e.g., LAANC and AIS/TFR). One 
company in particular asserts 15+ services available within its product; most to help during mission 
planning and when making go/no-go decisions. Similarly, several companies have developed USS 
systems per the UTM ecosystem concept (in the US) and U-space (in Europe). These can be directly 
applicable and enabling of future in-time safety assurance functions such as are described in Section 1. 
As mentioned previously, operational approval has been granted for limited package deliveries in 
urban/sub-urban settings (e.g., [7][8]). Lower-cost fault-tolerant architectures have been productized by 
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at least one sUAS manufacturer. Detect-and-avoid and sense-and-avoid (DAA/SAA) avionics for UAS 
have been the subject of standards and product development. Pilot programs have been sponsored by 
the FAA that include industry and local municipalities working together to explore ways to enable more 
routine operations near and over populated areas without compromising safety. Results are informing 
new rulemaking aimed at enhancing both capability and safety. One relevant example is ‘Remote ID’; a 
transponder-like capability for identifying and tracking UAS in the U.S. [67]. As described previously, 
aircraft location information is needed to fully achieve the in-time safety assurance system concept. 
Some insurance companies have begun to collect vast amounts of UAS operational data and at least one 
company maintains component reliability data. There are several examples of urban infrastructure and 
connectivity being developed for non-aviation purposes that may indirectly benefit urban aviation safety 
in the future (e.g., [16][21]). 
The Unmanned Aircraft Safety Team (UAST) is a government/industry group that is developing data-
driven consensus-based recommendations for safety enhancements [17]. One of their initiatives is to 
explore the extent to which data sharing across industry (such as is done for ASIAS) can have positive 
effect with respect to the safety goals of the UAS community. The UAST is modeled after the 
Commercial Aviation Safety Team (CAST), which has successfully defined and implemented >200 safety 
enhancements for commercial airline operations over the past 20+ years; including the ASIAS program. 
These are just a few examples of developments by an innovative and fast-moving industry. Safety 
assurance will likely be the enabler or the constraint to future operations that are routine, frequent, all-
weather, and highly-autonomous in urban environments. In other words, it may be the throttle or the 
brake on the train crossing this frontier. It seems industry recognizes this, and is moving in a positive 
direction toward enabling on-line and predictive capabilities such as suggested by the concept described 
herein. It remains however somewhat to be determined how these capabilities can complement or 
advance current SMS practices and design-time safety assurance processes used in the aviation sector. 
8. Summary and Plan for Updates 
This report comprises architecture and information requirements, recommendations, and 
considerations toward enabling in-time and predictive safety assurance capabilities within the domain of 
low altitude highly autonomous urban flight operations. This broad class of operations can include many 
types of missions, vehicles, human/system roles, and flight environment conditions. For this reason, any 
stated requirements should be considered initial requirements that can be used to drive R&D. Over the 
course of R&D by industry, academia, and government agencies, ConOps will mature for both urban 
flight operations and in-time safety assurance systems (e.g., [68]). Industry solutions and FAA policies 
will advance. It is also expected that additional hazards/risks will be identified, in particular for UAM, 
where function allocation, roles/responsibilities, vehicle designs, airworthiness requirements, and 
acceptable levels of safety are still being defined. 
To align with this evolution, this document and any associated research plans, standards, and 
developments will be updated in the future. 
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Appendix A: Enabling Technology R&D 
A range of models, sub-functions, and enabling technologies are under development where gaps exist 
with respect to the envisioned information system. A synopsis of relevant recent NASA activities is given 
here. Additional activities are planned, including for example, Cyber-security Threat Monitoring; Auto-
Pilot and Control System Monitoring; Automated Assured Contingency Planning and Execution, and 
Effective Interfaces for Human Oversight and Supervision. Many enablers are also being advanced by 
industry, academia, and other government agencies. Some of these are mentioned in Section 8. 
Geo-spatial feature models and databases 
Geospatial features (e.g., buildings, power lines, and trees) are collision hazards when flying at altitudes 
just above ground level. Techniques to avoid these obstacles are typically sensor-based or model-based 
or a combination of the two. Model-based approaches enable collision risk to be mitigated while 
planning the flight (proactively) and/or during the flight (reactively) if the horizontal and vertical extent 
of these obstacles are known (e.g., via surveying and timely updating). Before flight, an operator can 
choose flight plan waypoints that maintain a safe distance from obstacles that have been modeled and 
included in a database. During flight, onboard autonomy can compare the vehicle’s current location and 
predicted trajectory to the modeled features and if necessary maneuver to avoid collision in the event 
that the vehicle has strayed off-course due to off-nominal conditions (e.g., high winds). 
Although decades of R&D have led to quality geo-spatial model products and processes for maintaining, 
delivering, and using them in various domains, there are two modeling challenges we focus on with 
respect to the in-time safety assurance system concept and our domain of interest (i.e., low altitude 
urban operations). These we feel are gaps in state-of-the-practice. First, accurate and complete surveys 
of obstacle boundaries are required for some operations, and second, the obstacle boundaries must be 
represented compactly for efficient use by the higher level Monitor and Assessment functions. Aerial 
surveys of ground structures in the form of LIDAR point clouds [A1] can map geospatial features with 
decimeter-level accuracy and resolution. Compact representation of obstacle boundaries is needed, 
however, because detailed three-dimensional (3D) LIDAR surveys generate enormous data sets. The raw 
data size can overwhelm both visualization software used to plan flights and the onboard computing 
[A2] used for inflight automated avoidance. Naïve data reduction methods such as down-sampling prior 
to boundary determination risks the removal of critical features. 
Representing ground structures with bounding polyhedra instead of point clouds greatly reduces the 
data size and can enable effective obstacle avoidance, as long as the bounding geometry envelopes the 
structures with high spatial fidelity. There is a tradeoff between boundary complexity and compactness. 
Simple 2.5D boundaries are more than an order of magnitude more compact that 3D boundaries, but 
enclose more empty space than high-fidelity 3D ‘shrink wrap’ boundaries (Figure A-1, [A3]). Unless the 
interstitial airspace within the footprint of a ground structure is needed for contingency maneuvers (or 
to complete a mission, as in bridge and power line inspection flights), 2.5D models are adequate for 
collision avoidance. 
Survey data from satellite photogrammetry is now readily obtainable at low cost; and the AIS/AIM 
process provides many of the required features, particularly near airports. Commodity satellite-based 
surveys provide spatial accuracy as good as 3m (e.g., [A4]), which is about ten times worse than LIDAR-
based surveys. The spatial sampling of satellite-based surveys limits their precision to about 50cm, 
38 
 
which is about five times worse than LIDAR-based surveys. Since both sub-meter spatial sampling and 
accuracy are required to resolve and map small structures (e.g., power lines, guy wires and road signs), 
current satellite photogrammetry is suitable only for larger obstacles (e.g., buildings and trees). 
  
Population density models and databases 
All non-participant casualty estimation models require a population density representation within the 
area surrounding the flight path. Based on the application, such population density representations can 
be obtained using average arbitrary values for rural, suburban, and urban settings; commercially 
acquired high-resolution historical population activity density values; data collected by on-board 
sensors/cameras; or by (hypothetically) utilizing real-time population density data gathered by cellular 
phone towers. In the cases where real-time data is employed (sensor or cell-phone tower driven), the 
population density data can be used directly in casualty estimation calculation as they represent actual 
population on the ground. On the other hand, historical population density values can be used to feed 
population density models. For example, employing one city’s average hourly population density values 
to represent another metropolitan area with similar population. Another approach would be to create 
surrogate population density representations from available data (e.g., utilizing data from a Monday in 
June to represent other non-holiday Mondays during the summer). The commercially available 
population activity density data used for testing provides hourly-expected population values within a 
10m x 10m area and is based on cell-phone usage activity. The resolution of the population density data 
is used to inform the accuracy requirements of the impact point estimation, which is leveraged by the 
Figure A-1. Levels of model fidelity and cost for geospatial features. (1) At present, most 
geospatial feature sets available are akin to the brown building geometries at left. Since they 
can be can be constructed at high accuracy and with little effort from manual surveys or 
from processing lidar surveys or satellite image, this kind of model is predominant in ‘smart 
city’ geospatial databases. (2) The collision boundaries of trees (green cylinders at left) are 
the next most expensive kind of model. As long as human-drawn ground footprints exist, 
extruding the footprints to the height of raw lidar (blue-to-red colored dots, color gradient 
varied according to elevation) is fast and inexpensive. (3) Full 3D ‘shrink-wrap’ models 
(purple geometry at right) are the most accurate, yet the most expensive. The software to 
compute them at city scales is not widespread and requires accelerated processors. (4) 
Inexpensive satellite survey data cannot resolve fine features such as light poles (yellow 
structures, foreground left) and power lines (linear structures at right). Full-fidelity geospatial 
features require investment in collecting, archiving, and processing voluminous lidar survey 
data. 
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use of 6-DoF trajectory models. Monthly data for City of San Francisco, Reno, Corpus Christi, and Dallas 
Fort Worth, TX were acquired from AirSage, Inc. and are currently being used for pre-flight and in-flight 
risk assessment simulations. An example of this data is shown in Figure A-2, and applied as discussed in 
Appendix B and [A5]. 
 
Figure A-2. Sample population density data for the City of San Francisco [A5] 
Navigation system performance models and augmentation services 
For commercial air transportation, positioning, navigation and timing (PNT) data of sufficient quality is 
(or can be) provided during all phases of flight. This data is provided by high-quality sensors (often 
employed redundantly), and a myriad of available dissimilar PNT systems (e.g., IMU/INS, VOR, DME, 
GPS). For GPS in particular, various forms of augmentation systems have been deployed as well (e.g., 
GBAS, SBAS, and ABAS [53]). All to achieve a desired Required Navigation Performance (RNP) for a 
particular class of operations. Unfortunately, many of these systems are terrestrial-based and become 
increasingly unavailable as operational altitude decreases. Thus, low altitude flights, such as those for 
sUAS or UAM, will not have the access to the full suite of deployed PNT system options. For these low 
altitude operations, PNT sources are typically limited to inertial (IMU/INS) and GPS. In some cases, there 
may also be an Alternative PNT (APNT) system, but the coverage volume and performance of each such 
system will need to be considered [20][21]. 
Due to the importance of high-integrity PNT data for flight operations, combined with the scarcity of 
adequate solutions for low altitude urban flight, a navigation system performance (or quality) service is 
envisioned to support both flight planning and in-flight contingency management. This service would 
provide three types of information: (1) quality estimates and a forecast model of PNT performance (e.g., 
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for GPS); (2) corrections from available reference station(s) positioned within the urban environment to 
enable differential positioning; and (3) access to PNT estimates from any available APNT systems for the 
operational area. This concept is referred to as the NavQ service in Section 2 (Figure 4). The forecast 
model portion provides a means of predicting the quality and availability of PNT information for a given 
area. This model would be driven by characteristics of a PNT system (e.g., beacon location(s), transmit 
power, frequency, and receiver sensitivity) combined with a 3D terrain/obstacles model coupled with a 
model of multi-path and attenuation effects associated with the terrain/obstacles model. 
For most of these systems, GPS included, accounting for the effects of the terrain on signals becomes 
increasingly important in complex operational environments (e.g., urban canyons) due to RF effects such 
as shadowing, multipath and signal attenuation. Further refinement of this model can be accomplished 
if real-time measurements of a PNT system can be obtained from known locations in the area of 
interest. These can be used to update the prediction as well as to validate the model over time. 
Measurements can be obtained from various sources including vehicles operating in the area of interest 
as well as fixed ‘stations’ positioned on the ground and via a network, continuously quantifying the PNT 
systems performance at these known locations. This would be similar to the way in which the 
Continuously Operating Reference Stations (CORS) network operates across the U.S. Additionally, the 
resulting model can support a temporal component to account for time-vary performance that can 
result from non-fixed beacon locations for some PNT systems (e.g., orbiting satellites in GPS) and/or 
from changing environmental conditions. The output of this model is envisioned as a discretized 4D cube 
covering a given volume with estimates of the availability and accuracy of PNT systems for each grid cell 
and time increment. This reference frame could be similar or equivalent to that of other models used by 
other services or functions (e.g., a population density model, weather/wind model(s), an RFI model, and 
terrain/obstacle models). 
In cases where the aforementioned fixed stations are available to monitor GPS performance, 
measurements from these stations can also be used to improve positional accuracy of GPS receivers in 
the area. Network-based sharing of raw measurements (i.e., pseudorange, code phase, and carrier 
phase) from a set of such stations was developed and tested as the LOcation Corrections through 
DIfferential Networks (LOCD-IN) system [A6]. LOCD-IN was created as a means of enhancing GPS-based 
positioning accuracy without adding to the Size, Weight, Power and Cost (SWaP-C) as would be required 
for traditional methods.  LOCD-IN utilizes numerous signal processing methods as well as adaptations of 
techniques used for differential GPS, Real-Time Kinematic (RTK) GPS and the Ground Based 
Augmentation System (GBAS) to remove errors common to the measurements of both devices (the 
vehicle and base station) resulting in increased accuracy of position estimates [A7]. Figure A-3 shows an 
example of the performance improvement seen for a set of tests performed on NASA’s CERTAIN range. 
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Figure A-3. Example of GPS accuracy improvement using LOCD-IN [A7] 
(Left, Ave Error (6m), Stdev (19m); Right, Ave Error (30cm), Stdev (1.5m)) 
Link and Radio Frequency Interference (RFI) modeling 
Link and RFI modeling addresses hazards arising from RFI that can: (1) degrade or inhibit command and 
control (C2) and other communications links between the vehicle and ground station(s), and/or (2) 
couple into on-board electronic components to create performance anomalies in the avionics systems. 
Although both types of hazards are RF-related, they have different manifestations and thereby require 
different inputs and modeling approaches. The common information requirements to model both 
hazards for a defined airspace region is (a) geo-spatial data for objects in the region and (b) information 
about the RF characteristics of these objects as well as any equipment used within the system (e.g., on-
board avionics). 
On-going work applies traditional computational electromagnetic (CE) modeling techniques 
supplemented by updates received from airborne and ground-based measurements to produce 
radiation ‘maps’ of the flying area. Various CE tools can be used to generate maps such as those 
illustrated in Figure A-4. Much like small-scale weather maps, these radiation maps can be used during 
pre-flight to verify that the flight plan does not take the vehicle into areas that exceed the vehicle’s 
susceptibility level; or they could be used in-flight when/if it becomes necessary to re-route 
unexpectedly. 
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Modeling link performance in an operating area requires knowledge of the power budget for the 
communication link(s) and RF visibility between the vehicle and its ground station. Combining this 
information with the GIS model and flight plan information allows for estimation of link margin along 
the planned flight track. During pre-flight, this information help to maximize the link margin and reduce 
likelihood of link loss. Monitoring link performance during flight adds another layer of capability. It can 
sense directly a complex and time-changing RF environment that can result from spectrum crowding at 
the lower altitudes of urban flight. These interactions are extremely difficult to model fully.   
Modeling for RF energy hazards requires also knowing the coupling susceptibility of the vehicle (and its 
equipage) over a broad range of frequencies.  The effects of RF coupling into electronics is, at best, 
difficult to detect and quantify.  Exacerbating this issue is the difficulty of accounting for all sources that 
may emit RF energy into the operational airspace, and the dynamic nature of sources that may have 
directional gains (e.g., satellite beam pattern dispersions or radars operating near facilities). 
 
  Figure A-4. RF emission models for two sites at NASA LaRC. (Left) Transmitting antenna is at upper left 
of image at top of 180 ft structure; (Right) Transmitting antenna is at lower right of image at top of 50 ft 
building. Red indicates high received signal strength; Blue indicates low received signal strength; Black 
indicates no received signal strength (e.g., inside building structures). 
Battery and EPT modeling and prognostics 
In order to predict end-of-discharge as defined by a voltage cutoff, the battery model estimates the 
voltage as a function of time given the current drawn from the battery. The approach taken employs a 
lumped-parameter ordinary differential equations form of the battery, so it is efficient and usable for 
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on-line prognostics, yet still incorporates key electrochemical processes. Model parameters are specific 
to the batteries used on the vehicle; however, the model remains general enough that with some 
modifications it may apply to different battery chemistries. The vehicles under test have four such 
battery packs in series parallel configuration to get the required voltage and current. Each pack has its 
own model running in parallel to observe changes in the state-of-charge and report it back to the server. 
To identify an initial set of parameters, the battery is subjected to very low current close to open circuit 
voltage (OCV). Based on these curves the parameters for Nerst equations are identified. In the second 
step the Butler-Volmer equation parameters are identified wherein the battery is subjected to a 1C 
discharge. 
 
Figure A-5. ABC model validation with constant discharge (1C) profile 
In the final step, the model is validated against a variable loading discharge profile. The experiment 
simulation profile includes variable loading and captures the max and min load values to validate if the 
model is able to track it well within the error range. 
 
Figure A-6. ABC2 model validation with variable loading profile 
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A model-based prognostics architecture is then implemented [A8] in which there are two sequential 
problems: 
(1) The estimation problem, which requires determining a joint state-parameter estimate 
p(x(k),θ(k)|y(k0:k)) based on the history of observations up to time k, y(k0:k); and 
(2) The prediction problem, which determines at kP, using p(x(k),θ(k)|y(k0:k)), a probability 
distribution p(kE(kP)|y(k0:kP)). The distribution for ∆kE is computed from p(kE(kP)|y(k0:kP)) by 
subtracting kP. 
As shown in the prognostics architecture (Figure A-7), at discrete time k the system is provided with 
inputs, uk (e.g., voltage and current) and provides measured outputs, yk. The estimation module uses 
this information, along with the battery system model, to compute an estimate p(x(k),θ(k)|y(k0:k)). The 
prediction module uses the joint state-parameter distribution and the system model, along with 
hypothesized future inputs, to compute the probability distribution p(kE(kP)|y(k0:kP)) at given 
prediction times kP. 
  
Figure A-7. Generalized Prognostics Architecture 
In addition to the battery prognostics, a framework is being developed to do system level prognostics 
for the entire electric power train (EPT). This includes battery packs, speed controller, power electronics 
and motors. Each underlying sub-system degrades and fails at different rates. Since the systems are very 
much inter-dependent their degradation and failures can lead to cascading effects which are being 
considered in the framework development. As envisioned, all sub-systems can use a model-based 
diagnostics and prognostics architecture such as discussed above and in [A9]. 
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Appendix B: Initial End-to-End Services Tested 
To help to expose potential requirements for the system concept described in Section 1, three services 
were developed, tested, and evaluated in 2018-2019. These are considered stepping stones to the larger 
concept and illustrative of the functions and sub-functions ultimately envisioned. 
Non-Participant Casualty Risk Assessment 
The current implementations of the non-participant casualty risk assessment (NPCRA) capability consists 
primarily of monitoring available parameters and estimating the probability/risk of experiencing 
casualties on the ground following the aircraft experiencing a failure. The NPCRA capability is comprised 
of on-board and ground components, derived from the UTM Risk Assessment Framework (URAF) [B1] 
which outlines various models (population density, off-nominal trajectory and impact point model, 
probability of casualty estimation model, mishap likelihood model). The pre-flight implementation, 
called Ground Risk Assessment Service Provider (GRASP) is a server-based SDSP that assists operators 
with flight planning to understand and minimize the associated casualty risk of alternative flight plans 
[B2]. Figure B-1 is an example GRASP product for a flight plan over the area with the population density 
modeled as shown in Figure A-2. In this example, red dots indicate locations along the flight path where 
the casualty risk is estimated/predicted to be the highest. Given this information, the operator may 
choose an alternate flight plan (or time of day); then re-run GRASP to see if the risk is reduced. 
 
Figure B-1. Example casualty risk assessment for flight plan over the City of San Francisco [B2] 
The onboard implementation (called Real-time Risk Assessment (RTRA)) is designed to operate on cFS-
based aircraft and support autonomous on-board decision making by providing current and future 
ground casualty risk for projected paths, eventually aiding with mitigation re-routes in off-nominal 
conditions [B3]. Within the in-time safety assurance concept, future applications of NPCRA will bridge 
the on-board and server-based risk assessment capabilities to assist aircraft during all phases of flight as 
described in Application Domain section. 
This Assessment function is intended to estimate, track, and predict the risk of impacting populated 
areas in the event of critical system failure or loss-of-control. The function has been implemented in 
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various forms, supporting both pre-flight and in-flight applications. The pre-flight tool simulates the 
flight via the flight plan (waypoint) file and provides potential non-participant casualty risk assuming a 
critical system failure every ~15-20 meters where the NPCRA tool is running at the remote SDSP servers 
(Figure B-2) [B2].  In contrast, the real-time risk assessment function uses models loaded prior to flight in 
conjunction with real-time observables regarding aircraft state, system states, and the changing flight 
environment. The real-time implementation can take three forms. (1) The in-flight risk assessment tool 
aids the GCS operator with the NPCRA software solely operating on the GCS computer using downlinked 
flight parameters from the vehicle (Figure B-3a) [B1]. (2) The in-flight risk assessment tool executes on 
on-board computers with assessment results downlinked to the GCS for information purposes with the 
goal of assisting autonomous decision making and risk mitigation (Figure B-3b) [B3]. (3) The in-flight risk 
assessment tool supports airborne aircraft remotely via an Aircraft-GCS-SDSP link in a fully autonomous 
flight scenario (Figure B-3c). 
 
 
Figure B-2. Pre-flight NPCRA Access 
 
 
Figure B-3. Real-time NPCRA access options 
Based on the implementation, the outputs of this assessment function include: 
 Casualty probabilities (pre-flight applications) 
 GUI with color coded impact location/area visualizations (pre-flight applications) 
 Casualty risk (mishap likelihood and casualty probability estimates) (in-flight application) 
 Mishap likelihood and recommended action (abort, land, RTL, continue) (in-flight application) 
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The fidelity of the risk assessment is dependent upon the assessment type (pre-flight vs. in-flight) and 
the location where the software is executed (on-board, GCS, or SDSP). The pre-flight risk assessment 
exercise inherently carries more assumptions and yields to a lower fidelity and limited set of results. In 
particular, the pre-flight implementation runs a 3-DoF trajectory and impact point prediction model and 
only provides casualty probabilities, assuming the mishap is eminent at each time step since detailed 
aircraft state vectors are not available to inform a 6-DoF model. The pre-flight assessment is aimed to 
help operators minimize non-participant casualty probability during the planning phase and the risk 
assessment is expected to be updated throughout the flight. On the other hand, depending on the 
implementation, the in-flight applications can employ real-time vehicle health and state data that feeds 
the detailed Hugin Bayesian Belief Network (BBN) models and 6-DoF off-nominal trajectory models. 
Coupled with high-resolution population density data, the 6-DoF trajectory model should provide more 
accurate representation of the risk. Based on the current NPCRA implementation, data type and 
requirements are given in the Table B-1. 
Inputs: See Information Requirements section below. 
Testing: UTM TCL-3/4 Sprint sims (2019); CERTAIN flight tests (2018, 2019);’UAM X2 sim (2019) 
Access: Hosted on SDSP Server, with migration to AWS planned. The GUI is hosted at the GCS and as 
such available to operators to support pre-flight planning and go/no-go decisions. 
For more information:  
[B1] Ancel E, Capristan F., Foster, J.V., and Condotta, R. (2017) Real-Time Risk Assessment Framework 
for Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) Traffic Management (UTM), AIAA AVIATION Forum, 17th ATIO 
Conference (AIAA 2017-3273) 
[B2] Ancel E, Helsel, T., Heinich, T. (2019) Ground Risk Assessment Service Provider (GRASP) 
Development Effort as a Supplemental Data Service Provider (SDSP) for Urban Unmanned Aircraft 
System (UAS) Operations, AIAA/IEEE DASC 2019, San Diego, US. Sept. 9-12, 2019 
[B3] Ancel E, Capristan F., Foster, J.V., and Condotta, R. (2019) In-Time Non-Participant Casualty Risk 
Assessment to Support Onboard Decision Making for Autonomous Unmanned Aircraft, AIAA Aviation 
2019. (AIAA 2019-3053) 
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Table B-1. Model parameters vs. NPCRA implementation types 
Risk 
Assessment 
Variation 
Mishap 
Likelihood 
Assessment 
Trajectory 
and Impact 
Point 
Estimation 
Probability 
of Casualty 
Estimation 
Population 
Density 
Model 
Building 
Footprint 
Data 
Vertical 
Wind 
Profile 
Pre-Flight 
Casualty 
Assessment 
(Fig B-2) 
N/A (no real-
time flight 
parameters to 
assess aircraft 
health or 
mishap 
likelihood) 
3-DoF (point-
mass model) 
Probability 
of causing 
one or 
more 
casualties 
[B3] 
Acquired 
hourly  Activity 
Density data 
(see input 
requirements) 
N/A (can be 
expanded 
to include) 
User-
provided 
(SDSP 
acquired 
in the 
future) 
In-Flight 
computed 
on the GCS 
(Fig B-3a) 
Hugin BBN 
model which 
tracks limited 
downlinked 
MAVLink 
sensor data 
Differential 
of ballistic 
and point-
mass models 
to include 
uncertainty 
Expected 
number of 
casualties 
[B1] 
Modeled Local 
population 
data (e.g., 
LaRC) 
Modeled 
building 
footprint 
data (e.g., 
LaRC GIS) 
Locally 
measured 
values 
(e.g., 
Langley 
AFB tower 
data) 
In-flight 
computed 
on-board 
(Fig. B-3b) 
Hugin BBN 
model tracking 
detailed a/c 
health 
parameters & 
BHM/ vehicle 
prognostics via-
SDSP 
6-DoF 
[B3] 
Probability 
of causing 
one or 
more 
casualties 
[B3] 
Acquired 
hourly  Activity 
Density data 
(see input 
requirements) 
Planned 
expansion 
Locally 
measured 
or User 
provided 
In-flight 
provided by 
SDSP 
(Fig. B-3c) 
Hugin BBN 
model tracking 
downlinked 
health 
parameters 
(bandwidth 
limited) 
3-DoF or 6-
DoF (based 
on the 
availability of 
aircraft state 
vectors) 
Probability 
of causing 
one or 
more 
casualties 
[B3] 
Acquired 
hourly  Activity 
Density data 
(see input 
requirements) 
Planned 
expansion 
Locally 
measured, 
user 
provided 
or SDSP 
acquired 
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Battery Prognostics 
This Monitor and Assessment service/function is intended to estimate, track, and predict state-of-charge 
(SOC) and remaining useful life of onboard power source(s). Outputs provide the estimated time when 
end of discharge (EOD) will be reached; the estimated remaining flight time available; and the 
probability of reaching EOD before the end of the mission. 
In a manner analogous to a fuel gauge, SOC is provided on a linear scale (percentage) of available power, 
as well as a projected SOC at each waypoint along the planned trajectory.  To estimate when EOD will 
occur, the service/function employs a battery model to track the available energy in the battery and 
executes the model open loop to predict the EOD based on projected power consumption rates. The 
function also uses a separate motor system power model to estimate the required power for each flight 
segment, allowing for prediction of SOC at each waypoint in the flight plan.   
The function requires periodic measurements of battery voltage and current in order to update SOC and 
RUL predictions on-the-fly.  This allows the prognostic algorithm to adjust for changes in trajectory and 
flight conditions.  Data is streamed from sensors on the vehicle down to the ground station and 
forwarded on to the SDSP (see Figure B-4). This is similar to the NPCRA service (Figure B-3), but 
connecting to a different server. 
During pre-flight, the battery prognostic models are initialized with the vehicle parameters, the intended 
flight plan, as well as the battery parameters.  Once initialized, the algorithms calculate the prognostic 
metrics (SOC, RUL, EOD) as the stream of battery voltage and current data is delivered.  During the flight 
phase, the service provider expects regular updates of the voltage and current measurements (e.g., 
Figure B-3).   A request/reply protocol is implemented so the ground station or other safety monitoring 
applications can request the battery prognostic information from the SDSP server. The battery 
prognostics is currently deployed with the PtT service and reachable directly from the GCS.  Future work 
will allow access indirectly via AWS-based connection to the NASA USS (or other USSs). 
 
Figure B-4. Example of battery pack voltage and total current draw as sent to the SDSP at ~1Hz 
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Inputs: See Information Requirements below. 
Testing: UTM TCL-4 Sprint 4 sim (2019); CERTAIN flight tests (2018, 2019);’UAM X2 sim (2019) 
Access: Hosted on SDSP server, access via AWS-based connection to NUSS and/or GCS. 
For more information: 
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[B6] G. Sierra, M. Orchard, C. Kulkarni, K. Goebel. Flight Tests of a Remaining Flying Time Prediction 
System for Small Electric Aircraft in the Presence of Faults. Annual Conference of the Prognostics and 
Health Management Society, 2017. 
[B7] Kulkarni, Chetan; Schumann, Johann; Roychoudhury, Indranil (2018) On-Board Battery Monitoring 
and Prognostics for Electric-Propulsion Aircraft, AIAA/IEEE Electric Aircraft Technologies Symposium 
(EATS); July 09, 2018 - July 11, 2018; Cincinnati, OH; United States, 2018. 
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2018 - July 11, 2018; Cincinnati, OH; United States, July 09, 2018. 
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Electric Aircraft in the Presence of Faults, Annual Conference of the Prognostics and Health 
Management Society 2017; August 16, 2017. 
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Proximity to Threats 
Awareness of the proximity of conditions that may cause damage, harm, or operational interruption – 
“threats” – to a proposed or active flight plan is critical for safe operations.  Threats as defined for this 
service may be: 
 Static physical objects with vertical extent (e.g., buildings, poles, trees, or terrain) 
 Transitory non-physical objects (e.g., restricted airspaces, areas of adverse weather/winds, areas 
of expected RF interference or low signal strengths, areas of degraded navigation sensor 
performance, or sensitive ground locations/areas (e.g., school yards during recess) 
Proximity to threats such as these should be considered during preflight planning and monitored during 
flight to allow for contingency execution (i.e., mitigation) in the event of unexpected unplanned off-
nominal conditions. If the vehicle approaches a threat closer than a predefined threshold, holistic threat 
awareness is required to change the flight path to maintain a safe proximity to threats, even under the 
uncertainty inherent in operations. 
The initial implementation of this service considers proximity to buildings, poles, and trees. It takes as 
input the locations of these threats, pre-defined threshold(s) for closest allowed approach distance, a 
predicted flight path or trajectory, and a desired confidence that the flight will remain within that path. 
As output, the service provides locations along the flight trajectory at which the safety margin is 
predicted to fall below 100% of the minimum-allowed approach distance.  
For example, assume an aircraft must remain at least 5m laterally and 2m vertically from buildings and 
3m laterally and 1m vertically from trees; these are approach distance thresholds the operator can 
define as a configuration setting prior to flight. For testing, we created a 3-D database of building and 
tree locations pulled from LIDAR point clouds (for trees) and OpenStreetMap (for buildings). Building 
data consisted of perimeter footprints and a maximum height. Tree data consisted of tree canopy 
coverage and a maximum height. Although the current version of the service relies on a database or 
model of geo-referenced threats, it is designed to be agnostic to the source of threat information. For 
example, data may be sensor-derived or come from another service. For example, the existing and 
previously-mentioned AIS [36] can provide some of the required information. Although not yet ready for 
testing, the RFI and NavQ services may also be able to provide data in the form needed by the PtT 
service in cases where the operator would like to include these threats in this safety margin metric. 
Next, a nominal 4-D trajectory is generated based on the waypoints of a given flight path. A trajectory 
prediction is then created based on a gaussian distribution for the path, given the uncertainties of winds 
aloft, the onboard flight controller behavior, and other factors [C7]. For the final input, the aircraft 
operator selects a desired confidence level for the flight path assessment. For example, selecting 75% 
would task the service to compute (and track) the proximity of threats that cover 75% of the possible 
trajectories the flight may take given the considered uncertainties. 
As mentioned previously, the service uses these parameters to compute a safety margin between 
predicted flight trajectories and threats defined as above, outputting the time of occurrence when the 
predicted margin is below 100%. Figure B-5 shows an example situation illustrating one output of the 
service (i.e., the safety margin metric). 
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As with the battery prognostic (BP) service, the initial version of the Proximity to Threat service is 
reachable directly from the GCS via a request/reply protocol. Future versions will be accessible indirectly 
via AWS-based connection to the NASA USS (or other USSs or SDSPs). 
 
Figure B-5. Safety margin for a flight path near trees and buildings. Safety margin is computed using the 
percent error formula, that is, SM_proximity = (distance - threshold)/threshold*100, capped at 0% and 
100%. Thus, a margin of 0% means the flight path is closer to the object than the given threshold, i.e., 
there is no margin. A margin of 100% means the flight path is at least twice as far from the object as the 
given threshold. As an example, with a threshold of 5m, a point on the flight path that is 7m from a 
building has a margin of 40%, or 2m more than the closest allowed approach distance. 
 
In summary, this Assessment function is intended to estimate, track, and predict proximity metrics (time 
and distance) to geo-referenced features that represent threats along or near the flight path. The 
example used for testing has been the perimeter of fixed vertical features (e.g., buildings); but these 
could also represent no-fly zones or other hazardous areas defined by operators or ATM/UTM service 
providers. Outputs indicate those portions of the vehicle trajectory that are predicted to violate 
proximity thresholds to these threats. These include start/end points; nearest approach point; distance 
to nearest approach point; and severity of violation. As with NPCRA, this assessment can be done prior 
to flight using a flight plan, or in-flight using a trajectory prediction that is continuously updated during 
the flight. 
Inputs: See Information Requirements below. 
Testing: UTM TCL-4 Sprint 4 sim (2019); CERTAIN flight tests (2018, 2019);’UAM X2 sim (2019) 
Access: Hosted on SDSP server, access via AWS-based connection to NUSS and/or GCS. 
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Information Requirements (as tested) 
For these three services as tested, required input data is summarized below based on whether needed 
pre-flight or in-flight. 
Pre-flight info type NPCRA BP PtT Comment 
Configuration settings X X X e.g., Thresholds for warnings 
Vehicle information X X X e.g., Size, weight, model, #rotors/engine 
Aerodynamic model X 
 
X e.g., Drag coefficient 
Flight plan X X X 4D preferred (can be waypoint file) 
Battery model 
 
X 
 
Calibration procedure (every 8-10 flights) 
3D geo-feature 
database 
X 
 
X Buildings/obstacles/geo-fenced areas 
(polygons); terrain model (optional) 
Population density 
database 
X 
  
Stored at the server 
Wind vector (or 3D 
model) 
X 
 
X 3D model preferred 
Flight day/time X    
 
In-flight info type 
(@ 1 Hz or better) 
NPCRA BP PtT Comment 
Aircraft state X X X Position, velocity, attitude, heading 
Battery state X X 
 
For each battery pack: voltage, current, 
temp 
Engine/motor state X 
  
For each motor: current, temp, RPM 
Auto-pilot state X 
  
e.g., auto, manual, land, RTL ‘mode’ 
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Nav system state X 
  
e.g., GPS SVs and DOPs 
Comm system state X 
  
e.g., RSSI 
 
Vehicle Information (pre-flight) 
Number of rotors (required) 
Length of each arm (vehicle center to rotor center) (required) 
Dimensions of center body (desirable) 
Rotor diameter (desirable)  
Angle between each arm if not axial-symmetric (desirable) 
Mass (total) (required); Mass (rotors and arms) (desirable); Mass (battery(s)) (desirable) 
Mass (payload) (desirable) 
Battery pack configuration (serial /parallel) 
Battery maximum discharge rating 
Battery rating for discharge (nominal operation); Battery rating for charging 
 
Flight plan (pre-flight) (in-flight, if updated during flight) 
The following values are needed for each waypoint in the flight plan. Flight plans may be provided pre-
flight, or updated in-flight. 
Element Data 
Type 
Units Frequency Description 
Latitude double degrees N/A Current latitude position in degrees 
Longitude double degrees N/A Current longitude position in degrees 
Altitude double feet N/A Current altitude position in feet, WGS84 
Eta int64 microseconds N/A Expected time of arrival at waypoint, UNIX time 
desired flight 
speed 
double feet/s N/A Cruise, climb and descent. This can be used as an alternative to ETA, if 
expected ETA is not known. 
hold time at 
waypoint 
TBD TBD N/A Hold time at each waypoint. Required if ETA is not provided 
Proximity 
radius from 
waypoints 
double feet N/A The minimum radius from each waypoint such that when the UAV enters 
within that radius, it is considered to have reached that waypoint location. 
This enables smooth trajectories. In case these values are unavailable, specify 
the trajectory type: smooth or with sharp turns. 
 
Trajectory prediction data (in-flight) 
The trajectory prediction is built on a simple physics-based model of the vehicle, and generates the 
necessary predicted future states for proactive risk assessments. 
56 
 
Element Data 
Type 
Units Frequency Description 
timestamp_ms uint32 millis 1 Hz Timestamp (milliseconds since UNIX epoch) 
vehiclePositionLat_deg double decimal 
degrees 
1 Hz vehicle position in latitude, in decimal degrees 
vehiclePositionLon_deg double decimal 
degrees 
1 Hz vehicle position in longitude, in decimal degrees 
vehicleWGS84Alt_ft double feet 1 Hz vehicle WGS-84 altitude 
rpm_rotor 
 
rpm 1 Hz Rotor speed (rpm). Ideally RPM of each rotor. If not an average of 
all the rotors.  
groundSpeed_ftPerSec float feet/sec 1 Hz Ground Speed in (ft/s) 
heading_deg float degrees 1 Hz Heading (deg, True North) 
trueAirspeed_ftPerSec float feet/sec 1 Hz True airspeed in (ft/s) 
verticalSpeef_ftPerMinute float feet/min 1 Hz vertical speed in feet per minute, negative indicates descent 
groundCourse_deg int16 degrees 1 Hz Ground course, also known as track (degrees, true north) 
 
Battery telemetry (in-flight) 
Outputs from the battery telemetry calculations give estimated time when EOD will be reached (or est. 
remaining flight time) and probability of reaching EOD before end of mission. 
Element Data Type Units Frequency Description 
timestamp_ms uint32 ms 1 Hz Timestamp (milliseconds since system boot) 
temp_amb uint16 degrees C 1 Hz Temperature outside the vehicle, in centigrade 
voltage_pk uint16 volts? 1 Hz Battery voltage of each pack 
current_pk uint16 amperes 1 Hz Battery current of each pack 
temp_pk uint16 degrees C 1 Hz Temperature of the battery, in centigrade 
voltage_cell uint16[10] volts 1 Hz Battery voltage of each pack/ cells 
current_cell uint16[10] amperes 1 Hz Battery current of each pack/cells 
 
Aircraft state (in-flight) 
Element Data Type Units Description 
time_boot_ms uint32 millis Timestamp (milliseconds since system boot) 
pos_lat int32 degrees Current latitude position in degrees * 1E7 
pos_lon int32 degrees Current longitude position in degrees * 1E7 
pos_alt float meters AMSL Current altitude position in meters, AMSL 
57 
 
Appendix C. Uncertainty Management Framework 
A formal approach to uncertainty quantification is proposed, identifying four main sources of uncertainty. 
Then, those uncertainty sources map within a predictive estimation process, modified from [C1], which 
outlines input-output relationships of the predictive framework and helps modeling of uncertainty within 
its elements. Uncertainty sources and predictive process architecture define the critical elements 
necessary for meaningful uncertainty quantification. Thus, frameworks for quantitative in-time safety 
predictions should always include those critical elements, or a sub-set of them, to enable reliable 
prognostics.  
Uncertainty Sources 
The four macro-categories model, method, measure, and input have been chosen to represent uncertainty 
sources in the predictive estimation process. Each of them comprises of sub-categories that are depicted 
in Figure C-1, and are discussed below [C1][C2][C3][C4]. 
 
Figure C-1. High-level classification of uncertainty sources encountered in a predictive process 
Model abstraction refers to the hypotheses introduced during model development with the intent of 
representing reality and physical processes through a set of equations. Model parameters include fixed 
or variable coefficients required to estimate the output quantities of interest (QoIs) from the model. Here, 
methods refers to the collection of algorithms and computation tools utilized to compute the QoIs, to 
interpolate or extrapolate input variables from input data, or to perform prediction by propagating 
information through models or in time domain. They have been divided into algorithms and numerical 
errors. Algorithms introduce uncertainty because they may converge to sub-optimal solutions trying to 
minimize errors or cost functions. As a result, different runs of the algorithms may generate different 
results because the algorithms remain trapped in local minima. Numerical errors include roundoff or 
discretization errors, which may be negligible for most of the applications.  Measures includes measure 
incompleteness, uncertainty in measurement equipment, which typically translates into sensor resolution, 
accuracy and precision, and systematic errors generated by the measuring process, sensor installation and 
human error (if humans are involved in the measuring process). Input includes time-dependent variables, 
initial and boundary conditions, and exogenous forces that may interact with the system and therefore 
affects its dynamics. Operational input are defined according to the system’s intended function. External 
inputs are generated by external forces or events which depend on the operational environment of the 
system, and are typically characterized by large uncertainty. Initial and boundary conditions refer to both 
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external and system’s variables.  Table C-1 shows an exemplifying list of uncertainty sources first 
considered for in-time prediction of aircraft remaining trajectory and powertrain health assessment. The 
list should not be considered exhaustive, as involves only a subset of tasks for in-time safety assessment 
of the airspace. More, specific sources of uncertainty will be added as more research is performed and 
experimental evidence collected. 
 
Table C-1. Example of uncertainty sources affecting the predictive process for in-time safety assessment. 
(Source type codes are Model (Ml), Method (Md), Measure (Ms) and Input (I)) 
Type Description 
Ml Abstraction of vehicles operating in the airspace (e.g., complexity of vehicle models) 
I/Ml Vehicle ability to execute desired kinematic profile 
I/Ms Weather conditions: temperature, air density, wind field over flight path 
I/Ms Dynamic obstacle size and location 
I/Ms/Ml Initial conditions of the vehicle: state of health of safety-critical component and propulsion 
system, battery state of charge, etc. 
Ms Sensor precision, accuracy, resolution 
Ml/Md Degradation progression: vehicle structural and dynamic properties 
Ml/Md Degradation progression: vehicle powertrain system 
Ml/Md Degradation progression: sensor degradation and sensor faults 
Md “Local minima effects” from numerical solutions of model equations 
Md Aleatoric variability hidden in the prediction process 
Md Anomaly detection capability for a variety of vehicles in the airspace 
 
Architecture of the predictive process 
Figure C-2 shows a diagram of the high-level predictive process structure proposed in [C3][C4]. From left 
to right, we introduce the measure space, which represents quantities that must be measured. The input 
space represents those variables not belonging to the system that is being monitored but affect the 
system’s dynamics. The input space overlaps with the measured space, since external variables must be, 
somehow, estimated or measured. Measured space and Input space variables feed the representation 
space, which comprises of system’s models and input models. While the introduction of the system’s 
model is self-explanatory, the reason for incorporating input models is twofold. Engineering systems are 
often described by differential equations or systems of equations, and input specifications may not be 
written in a form that is directly implementable into those equations. Input models play a relevant role 
also for external variables. Some external variables affecting the system’s dynamics may be hidden (not 
directly measurable), and therefore a model to extract the latent variable(s) from observations is 
necessary. Often, external variables are non-deterministic and affected by large uncertainty, and a model 
to perform quantification and look-ahead forecast becomes a necessity. The computing space includes 
numerical tools and models are combined to provide an estimation of the current QoIs of the system and 
their future values. 
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Figure C-2. Predictive process structure. The bottom arrow describing uncertainty propagation does not 
indicate that uncertainty is introduced only in the measure and input spaces, but it rather indicates that 
all the elements in the predictive process introduce uncertainty, which increases from left to right. 
 
Case study 1 – Uncertainty Quantification applied to small UAV powertrain health monitoring 
In this example, the UQ framework is applied to the design of a health monitoring system for electrical 
powertrain typically installed in small, low-cost UAVs. The health monitoring system consists of an 
electrochemistry model for Li-ion batteries developed in [C5], a model for the electronic speed controller 
(ESC) composed of a pulse-width modulation (PWM) system and six switches [C6], and the dynamic model 
of the brushless DC motor utilized to actuate rotors. Under some simplifying assumptions listed in [C3], 
the uncertainty affecting the powertrain elements is modeled as follows. The predictive process structure 
for powertrain health is depicted in Figure C-3. 
The electrochemistry model for Li-ion batteries is modified to account for uncertain number of Li-ions 
moving from the positive sides of cell surface and bulk, as in Eq. (UM.1), 
𝑞𝑘 = 𝑞𝑘−1 + ?̇?𝑘−1Δ𝑡 + 𝜎𝑞√Δ𝑡 𝑟       (UM.1) 
Where 𝑟 is a random realization from the standard Normal distribution. The output voltage of the battery 
can then be estimated by propagating uncertainty through the model [C3]. The ESC model is shown in Eq. 
(UM.2).  
[
𝑣𝑎𝑏
𝑣𝑏𝑐
𝑣𝑐𝑎
] = 𝑉 [
1 −1 0
0 1 −1
−1 0 1
] [
𝐹1
𝐹2
𝐹3
]       (UM.2) 
 
system models
Input models
REPRESENTATION SPACE
External variables
Operational variables
INPUT SPACE
System variables
MEASURE SPACE
Estimation methods
Prediction methods
COMPUTING SPACE
Uncertainty propagation
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Figure C-3. Predictive model for powertrain health monitoring system 
Uncertainty affecting battery voltage is accounted for in the battery model, Eq. (UM.1). The switch 
matrix can be modeled through reliability analysis and failure rates 𝜆 defining how often switches fail. 
The PWM input 𝑭 = [𝐹1, 𝐹2, 𝐹3]
𝑇 depends on a sine wave carrier frequency 𝑓, which decreases when 
the MOSFET degrades [C7]. An approach could be to model the carrier frequency as a slowly, 
monotonically-decreasing process, Eq. (UM.3). 
𝑓𝑘 = 𝑓𝑘−1 −
d𝑓
d𝑡
|
𝑘−1
𝑒𝜂         (UM.3) 
The random process 𝑒𝜂 , 𝜂 ∼ 𝑁(− 𝜎2 2⁄ , 𝜎2) ensures the degradation process is monotonic. The DC motor 
first-order equation well-describe its dynamic behavior, but inertia and especially friction coefficient may 
be known with certain confidence. They can be modeled using bounded probability distributions (e.g., 
log-Normal, Weibull, Rayleigh), so that uncertainty during transient periods and varying rotational speed 
can be accounted for [C3]. Figure C-4 shows some results from the application of the UQ approach to a 
synthetic powertrain. 
Case study 2 – Uncertainty quantification of times of arrival during autonomous flight 
This case study shows the application of the uncertainty quantification framework to trajectory prediction 
of small UAVs. The approach enables the estimation of the uncertainty in the times of arrival (TAs) at the 
predefined waypoints and over the entire trajectory [C7][C8]. It is an example where operational variables 
are deterministic (i.e., deterministic flight plan), but uncertainty of environmental conditions and internal 
states, controller performance, etc. can affecting the actual time of arrivals at the desired locations. This 
case study needs a limited number of elements of the predictive estimation process; namely the input 
space (operational variables, external variables), the input model, and the computing space containing 
the algorithm to estimate the TAs. Future stage of the research will include vehicle models and the 
capability to update the confidence intervals on the TA based on vehicle performance. 
Li Battery ESC BLDC Motor
Control Circuit
POWERTRAIN MODELS
PWM CONTROLLER
EXTERNAL INPUT
Load Tl
ia, ib, ic
vab
vbc
vcaV
iapp
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Figure C-4. Example of effects of uncertainty modeling on powertrain dynamics. Battery discharge (a), 
degrading PWM (b), switch failure (c), and effects of uncertain DC motor model parameters on motor 
speed profile (d). 
The methodology assumes that both internal and external disturbances produces variations in the vehicle 
speed during flight. Such variations can be represented by uncertainty of such vehicle speed in the form 
of intervals or variance according to Uniform or Gaussian distributions, respectively. Uncertainty is then 
propagated via error intervals. The result is a 4D trajectory (space and time) enhanced by uncertainty in 
the TAs along the flight route.  
Using the uncertainty on the vehicle speed as input variable, TA at waypoint k, 𝑡𝑎,𝑘, can be defined as in 
Eq. (UM.4) assuming Uniformly-distributed velocity or Eq. (UM.5), in case of Normally-distributed velocity. 
𝑡𝑎,𝑘 ∼ 𝑈[𝑡𝑎,𝑘 − 𝛿𝑡𝑎,𝑘 , 𝑡𝑎,𝑘 + 𝛿𝑡𝑎,𝑘]       (UM.4)  
𝑡𝑎,𝑘 ∼ 𝑁(𝑡?̅?,𝑘, 𝜎𝑡𝑎,𝑘
2 )         (UM.5) 
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
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The term  𝑡̅ indicates the expected value or average of 𝑡, 𝛿𝑡𝑎,𝑘 is the error on the expected TA, while 𝜎𝑡𝑎,𝑘
2  
is its variance. Estimation of error interval and variance of TAs is reported in [C8]. Figure C-5 shows an 
example of small UAV trajectory enhanced by the estimation of its uncertainty on the TAs, for a short 
flight carried out by an Octocopter at NASA Langley Research Center. Figure C-5(a) shows the nominal 
trajectory in thick, dashed blue line, and the confidence intervals computed using Normal (black dot-
dashed) and Uniform (dashed red) distributions. The nominal trajectory prediction was generated using a 
NURBS (Non-Uniform Rational B-Spline) algorithm proposed in [C7]. Figure C-5(b) compares the 
confidence intervals from the proposed approach with the actual path recorded during flight, obtained 
from the filtered position estimation from the vehicle autopilot. The confidence intervals enables the 
estimation of the times of arrival of the vehicle at all waypoint, which can be computed during flight. 
Figure C-5(c) shows the uniform distributions (blue rectangles) of the TA of each way-point computed 90 
seconds after take-off (the prediction time is represented by the upside-down black triangle). The smaller, 
red upside-down triangles shows the observed (true) arrival time. More details on trajectory generation, 
uncertainty quantification and prediction are available in [C7][C8]. 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
 
(c) 
 
Figure C-5. Example of trajectory with TA Uniform and Gaussian confidence intervals (a), comparing the 
trajectory prediction enhanced by confidence interval with the executed flight path (b), predicted 
probability distributions of the time of arrival at each waypoint 90 seconds after take-off (c). 
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Appendix D. Aerodynamic Modeling 
As part of the concept of model-based in-time safety assurance, aerodynamic modeling enables the 
prediction of vehicle states, flight behaviors, and performance which in turn can be applied to various 
forms of risk monitoring. Examples of this include range/endurance prediction, flight envelope and 
maneuvering limits, and trajectory prediction during off-nominal events such as failures or loss-of-
control.  NASA research has been in progress to develop concepts and methods for implementation of 
aerodynamic modeling and state prediction as a Supplemental Data Service (SDS). This effort has 
included defining modeling requirements, identifying data sources, and development of algorithms for 
rapid state prediction.  
Current aerodynamic modeling research under System Wide Safety (SWS) builds on risk assessment 
research initiated under the UAS Traffic Management (UTM) project.  This effort focused on trajectory 
prediction of small multirotor vehicles during off-nominal events including propulsion failures and 
control system anomalies. A Commercial Off-The-Shelf (COTS) quadcopter was used as a proof-of-
concept vehicle to develop an all-attitude aerodynamic database which was subsequently implemented 
into a six-degree-of-freedom (6-DOF) flight dynamics simulation [D1]. The aerodynamic database was 
developed from experimental wind tunnel measurements for static and dynamic conditions (Figures D-1 
and D-2), and was implemented as modular aerodynamic models for the rotor propulsion system, 
fuselage, and rotor/fuselage interaction effects.  Key findings in this effort were that a properly designed 
aerodynamic database can predict highly non-linear flight dynamics for off-nominal events and 
important characteristics specific to rotors, such as vortex ring state, should be considered for off-
nominal trajectory prediction. Additionally, the aerodynamic measurements enabled accurate 
prediction of performance parameters, such as range and endurance that may not be adequately 
predicted by simplified or low-order models. While efforts so far relied on experimental aerodynamic 
measurements, a key recommendation was to consider computational methods as a source of 
simulation data depending on the accuracy requirements. 
 
Figure D-1. Static wind tunnel testing of a small quadcopter for aerodynamic database development 
(NASA LaRC 12-Foot Tunnel) 
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Figure D-2. Free-flight wind tunnel testing of a small quadcopter for aerodynamic database development 
(NASA LaRC 20-Foot Vertical Spin Tunnel) 
Research by Ancel, et al [D2] presented the preliminary concepts toward use of trajectory prediction for 
real-time risk assessment. The high-fidelity simulation reported in [D1] was used to calibrate low-order 
point mass trajectory prediction methods where the vehicle was in a high drag, tumbling mode due to a 
loss of control event. The motivation for a low-order model was due to onboard computing 
considerations and unknown computing requirements to run a complex 6-DOF simulation in near real 
time. The results of this research demonstrated the feasibility of integrating probabilistic impact areas 
with population densities to allow an estimate of casualty areas. 
 
Figure D-3. Illustration of ground impact area prediction for casualty estimation [D2] 
Follow-on work presented in [D3], investigated the implementation and computing requirements for a 
more complex onboard non-linear trajectory prediction for real-time risk assessment.  A full 6-DOF 
simulation was installed in an onboard computer on a multirotor vehicle and used to provide real-time 
estimates of ground impact areas in the event of an off-nominal (loss of control) event. This testing 
demonstrated the feasibility of running onboard high-order flight dynamics simulations to provide 
critical information for risk assessment. While this effort was limited to propulsion failures, the 
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feasibility of predicting trajectories due to other failures or off-nominal events was demonstrated and 
the modeling of various failures (e.g., sensor anomaly) remains a topic for future research.  
Research presented in [D4] addressed the use of a high-fidelity multirotor flight dynamics simulation 
[D1] for flight envelope assessment and prediction of stability boundaries. This study addressed the 
important influence of rotor aerodynamics on flight envelope limits and highlighted key differences 
between flight envelopes for multirotor vehicles and conventional fixed-wing vehicles. For example, 
Figure D-4 illustrates various estimated boundaries that may define the safe envelope for trajectory 
planning. Additionally, various optimal performance conditions may be estimated such as those for 
maximum range and airspeed for minimum power usage. 
 
 
 
Figure D-4. Safe envelope estimation from a high-fidelity quadcopter simulation [D4] 
Due to the known limitations of battery systems, the ability to predict endurance, time aloft and range 
will be a critical requirement for flight planning and aerodynamic modeling will likely be an important 
tool for safety assurance. In the context of model-based safety assurance, future research includes 
investigating the use of vehicle aerodynamic and state prediction models for applications to pre-flight 
planning, flight envelopes limits, and look-ahead or in-time calculations of performance parameters. 
Information requirements – to create an initial model: 
1. Propulsion effects 
a. Rotor aerodynamic forces and moments (at least thrust, drag, and torque) as a function 
of flow inclination angle and rotor advance ratio 
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b. Propeller and/or turbine propulsion aerodynamic forces and moments as a function of 
flow inclination angle, advance ratio (for a propeller) or flight condition (for a turbine 
engine) 
2. Fuselage aerodynamic forces and moments as a function of total flow inclination angle (typically 
angle of attack and angle of sideslip) and control surface deflections; interference effects from 
the propulsion system such as rotor downwash 
3. Mass properties including vehicle gross weight and moments of inertia 
4. Performance metrics based on above such as flight conditions for maximum endurance, 
maximum range and best climb performance 
5. Maneuvering limitations including maximum normal load factor, maximum turn rate and 
maximum body-axis angular rates 
6. Envelope limits such as stall angle of attack, stall airspeed, maximum velocity and maximum 
normal load factor and relevant stability boundaries 
Information requirements – to validate or otherwise improve the quality of the model over time 
1. Flight data for steady 1g trim conditions and control response during maneuvering 
2. Rotor performance data (computational, flight measurements, empirical) 
3. Fuselage/airframe performance (computational, flight measurements, empirical) 
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Appendix E. More on In-Time Safety Assurance Functions 
As described previously, in-time safety assurance systems comprise three high-level functions: Monitor, 
Assess, and Mitigate. These functions are described in Section 1 and in more detail below. Additional 
information can be found in [1], [2], and [6]. 
 Monitor – A collection of functions and information services that provide awareness and 
predictive capability regarding relevant information types. These capabilities should be designed 
such that uncertainty can reduce over time based on evolving on-line model validation (e.g., 
initial models and databases are updated over time based on operational data to improve 
quality of the monitoring services). Information produced by these functions are recorded 
and/or shared during operations with on-line assessment functions and services. 
 Assess – One or more function or service that can span hazard types, contexts, and/or cascades 
to look for precursors, anomalies, and trends (PATs) with respect to overarching risk tolerance, 
aggregate safety metrics, and desired margins. Outputs from this function may be fed to auto-
mitigate functions, operators for human intervention, and/or designers for off-line product 
improvements. 
 Mitigate – Automated or multi-agent planning and execution of timely responses when 
necessary to maintain a desired safety margin (e.g., selecting and executing fail-safe auto-
mitigations under certain safety-critical circumstances). 
The scope of each function can be tailored to specific operational requirements of a given domain (e.g., 
hazard types, assurance levels, mitigation actions and agents). For example: 
 Functions may reside at a remote service provider location (e.g., an SDSP or USS or SWIM), 
within the Ground Control Station (GCS), and/or onboard the vehicle. 
 Functions may be employed pre-flight, in-flight, and/or post-flight. 
 A human role may exist within functions, or as oversight to configure, supervise, or intervene. 
Earlier in this document we describe a set of sub-functions and enabling technologies we are developing 
and testing that fall from the scope and assumptions given in Section 1 with respect to these high-level 
functions. These address apparent gaps between state-of-the-practice and the larger concept. Per the 
ConOps, a hazard assessment should be done for each unique domain or use-case (considering the 
vehicle, mission, and environment); then the appropriate set of sub-functions and enabling technologies 
can be applied to help mitigate any risks that are judged as too high without such mitigation. In other 
words, these can become tools to help make a safety case. 
As described in Appendix B, two types of Assessment functions are initially developed. The first 
estimates the likelihood and consequence of a catastrophic event. Wherein the catastrophic event 
initially considered is a non-participant casualty. This function considers several hazard types that can 
contribute to the likelihood and consequence estimates, while also considering uncertainty propagation. 
The second uses proximity to high-risk areas as an aggregate measure. This approach is analogous to the 
Terrain Awareness and Warning System (TAWS) and the Traffic Alerting and Collision Avoidance System 
(TCAS). However, it allows for mapping several hazard types into a common geo-spatial reference frame. 
In other words, several types of areas or volumes can be hazardous for different reasons (i.e., not just 
terrain and traffic). 
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Ground-based services are in most cases, data-driven model-based predictive services that may provide 
or support aspects of all three functions: monitoring, assessment, and/or mitigation. An aircraft 
‘connection’ to these services between flights versus during flights must carefully consider several 
factors including link bandwidth limits, information security and integrity, and risk exposure. 
On-board services may also be model-based but are predicting (including making assessments) to much 
shorter time horizons and at higher rates and with more fidelity. For UAS, because there is no pilot 
onboard, some assessment and mitigation sub-functions will be automated/autonomous. We call these 
‘auto-assess’ and ‘auto-mitigate’ functions. These functions may coordinate with relevant ground-based 
services in-flight; but this would primarily be done pre-flight (e.g., updating to latest model or 
information set) or post-flight (sending observations/data recorded during the flight to help with 
validation/update processes). It is recommended that link reliance be avoided during flight for such 
autonomous functions (i.e., flight-critical functions that may re-direct the flight). 
Operator station functions would support the operator to manage/mitigate safety risks in different ways 
depending on the trained role of the operator and the phase of the operation: pre-flight, in-flight, and 
post-flight. Here, the human-system interface must provide for effective situation awareness and 
supervision given the automation functions that have been applied. 
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Appendix F. Test Summaries 
Several tests were conducted during 2018-2019 to expose and validate requirements; evaluate the 
efficacy and feasibility of the envisioned information system; demonstrate interoperability within a UTM 
ecosystem; collect data to support R&D of on-line analytics tools regarding PATs; verify and advance 
technology maturity for selected elements; and inform decisions regarding R&D priorities and plans. 
These tests are summarized below. 
Flight Testing at CERTAIN 
Over 200 flights were conducted at NASA Langley’s CERTAIN test range using the architecture described 
in Figures 4-6. Flight scenarios were designed to facilitate system checkout as well as to mimic two 
urban use-cases. The first was single-vehicle (and occasional multi-hop) transit flights such as would be 
performed for surveillance monitoring or small package delivery. The second was multi-vehicle flights 
executing coordinated merging-and-spacing maneuvers as may be required when sequencing for 
sharing of flight path segments near verti-ports in urban areas. Both included some roof top takeoffs 
and landings as well as flight near building structures and over people, surface traffic, and streets. 
Images of the flight test operational areas and flight plans are shown in Figures F-1 and F-2. 
 
Figure F-1. Flight test location on CERTAIN (B1202 Rooftop as Takeoff/Landing Location) 
During the flights, many of the ‘apps’ described in Section 2.3 (and shown in Figure 6) were operational 
on the test aircraft; as were the ground-based functions shown in Figure 5 and described further in 
Appendix B. As shown in Figure 6, onboard avionics consisted of COTS systems operating in parallel with 
the cFS-based research system. The COTS-based avionics were Arducopter/Pixhawk-based. cFS and 
research ‘apps’ were hosted on a NUC single-board computer. The research system accessed 
Arducopter/Pixhawk information via a serial telemetry port. CANbus communication is used to pass data 
gathered by the research data system to the NUC single-board computer. To test auto-migitations, the 
ICAROUS technology was used in a manner similar to previous testing [31]. Namely, ICAROUS 
commanded a switch of the COTS autopilot (Arducopter) from ‘auto’ mode to ‘guided’ mode. Then, 
after the mitigation was complete (e.g., desired spacing and flight path conformance was achieved), 
ICAROUS commanded a switch back to ‘auto’ mode. 
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Figure F-2. Flight test location on CERTAIN (North of B1202) 
In addition to continuously monitoring and reporting (e.g., back to the SDSP servers), selected ground-
based infrastructure technologies were also tested per the envisioned OS&N concept for monitoring RF, 
wind, weather, and navigation system quality in urban areas. For this purpose, a network of stations 
were positioned at rooftop locations across CERTAIN. Although this network was connected and 
operational, the data was not part of an end-to-end in-time safety assurance service for these tests. This 
is a subject of future work. 
Since the information system (not the aircraft) is the central focus of the research, flights used low cost, 
commercially available multi-rotor platforms. For these tests, COTS octo-copters were used, modified to 
host Arducopter/Pixhawk, the cFS-based research system, and other equipment (e.g., Safeguard for 
conformance monitoring [33][34], a Software Defined Radio (SDR) for monitoring received signal 
strength on selected RF channels, and a NextNav receiver [22]). 
Flight tests began with some basic capabilities and a single vehicle, then progressed to increasingly 
integrated systems, functionality, and complex multi-vehicle scenarios. Some tests were tailored to 
evaluate or demonstrate or collect data for specific elements of the system. A breakdown of these tests 
is given in Table F-1. Illustrative examples of data collected are given in Figures F-3 and F-4. An example 
of the research GCS operator interface is shown in Figure F-5. 
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Table F-1 Examples of tailored testing of selected functions or system elements. 
 
 
Figure F-3: Data exchange verification test. Voltage (left) and current (right) levels as sent from GCS 
(blue) and received by the Battery Prognostics (BP) service over the 4G LTE cell phone network. Data 
sent from vehicle to GCS was via a 900 MHz telemetry link. This data segment is from a landing during a 
multi-stop flight scenario. 
 
System/Function #Flights Data Note
RF monitoring 6 500+ GB I-Q data: 2.4 GHz and 900 MHz ISM bands
Safeguard (Tests for Class B certification) 7 Various verification logs
Battery Prognostics (BP) 64 Battery usage data (Flight plan power estimation)
APNT system (NextNAV) 7 Logs on various systems
Real-Time Risk Assessment (RTRA) 32 cFS RTRA app logs, 1 log per flight
Interfacing with SDSPs and UTM
10
Verify data marshalling between vehicle and server. Checks of 
receipt of “Trajectory”, “Battery EOD”, and “Battery SOC” info 
from Ames-based SDSP services
UTM M&S software integration tests
55
(38 Cerf)
(17 ISSAAC)
Single and multi-vehicle test cases verifying merge and 
spacing algorithm using ICAROUS 
Operating in conjunction with on-board and off-board services
Checks of RTRA interoperability on-board
73 
 
 
Figure F-4. GCS and research telemetry link data packets as seen by the SDR RF sensor during Flight 141 
(multiple transmitting links operating) 
 
Figure F-5. Research GCS display showing vehicle geometries at beginning of merging scenario. Isaac 
aircraft (left); Cerf aircraft (bottom right); Sim1 is a simulated aircraft (top right). Labels are aircraft 
altitudes. All three aircraft are moving toward a merge point (center). 
Research system 
telemetry link packets
GCS telemetry link packets
Ti
m
e
Frequency
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UTM TCL-4 Sprint 4 Simulation 
The ‘Sprint 4’ tests were conducted in February 2019. This was an extension of the ‘Sprint 3’ exercise, in 
which the team demonstrated basic integration and communication with the Airspace Operations 
Laboratory (AOL) USS (a.k.a the ‘NASA USS’) to show interoperability within the UTM architecture. At 
the time of this testing, the developmental SDSP service provided two safety metrics: battery End-of-
Discharge (EOD) prediction and obstacle proximity prediction. These are referred to more generally in 
Figure 4 and Appendix B as the ‘BP’ and ‘PtT’ services. The architecture used for the simulation is shown 
in Figure F-6. 
 
Figure F-6. SDSP Architecture for UTM Sprint 4 Simulation Testing 
This testing was limited to USS implementers and did not have an “Actor Role” for SDSP participation. 
Nevertheless, we wanted to build upon Sprint 3 capability and show a more complete integration 
between the NASA Ames Airline Operations Lab (AOL) USS and the SDSP server. In addition to testing 
the connection with AOL USS, we wanted to demonstrate reliable transmission of the prognostic event 
data as calculated by SDSP back to the AOL USS for display. 
A flight scenario was chosen from the set of scenarios previously flown at NASA Langley in 2018. We 
specifically chose Scenario ‘4’ as it was the shortest and the sim was configured to run for only a few 
minutes. Simulated GPS coordinates were based on flight test data from the Langley flights of 2018. 
Battery calibration parameters were set to be the same as used for the flights. 
Scenario 4. Simulate building proximity violations; test system connectivity performance as well as the 
performance of the predictive services for battery EOD and proximity to obstacles. Description: See 
Figure F-7. Start at rooftop launch point (A), pick up package at E, deliver to G, return to base (A). Due to 
time-criticality of package, fly direct to G. Plan: A @ 0m, A-E @ 10m, E @ 0m (hover, 15sec), E @ -10m 
(land), E-G @ 30m, G @ 0m (hover, 15sec), G @ -10m (land), G-F-B-A @ 30m, A @ 0m(land). 
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Figure F-7. Scenario 4 Flight Plan Waypoints (based on CERTAIN flight tests) 
During the tests, both position and battery performance data were successfully received from the UTM 
simulation via the RESTful interface, and safety metrics were calculated with that data using the 
PaaS/GSAP architecture. Performance was verified via real-time server logs on the SDSP side. Safety 
metric events were then returned to the AOL console screen, displaying time to each event, time to end 
of event, and threshold percentages. Communication reliability and data integrity were established 
during Sprint 3, thus in test we successfully showed that the events could be successfully returned to the 
AOL USS and displayed to the user. Figure F-8 is a screenshot of the chart displaying proximity metrics 
for one of the tests. 
 
Figure F-8. AOL Console Screenshot with Proximity Predictions from Server 
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UAM X2 Simulations 
The X2 simulation experiment was designed to test a service-oriented ATM architecture for future UAM 
operations. The simulation was conducted by NASA’s ATM-X project and was aimed primarily at ATM 
issues such as scheduling and de-conflicting UAM vehicles flying into and out of vertiports in the 
Dallas/Fort Worth area. Varying levels of automation were considered to assist in traffic management. 
X2 is part of preliminary work leading to the Grand Challenge (GC) series of events planned for coming 
years. The stated goals/objectives of the GC series are as follows1:  
“The Grand Challenge itself will be a full field demonstration in an urban environment that tests the 
readiness of companies’ vehicles and airspace operators’ systems to operate during a full range of 
passenger transport and cargo delivery scenarios under a variety of weather and traffic conditions.” 
“Its objectives are to: 
•    Accelerate technology certification and approval 
•    Develop flight procedure guidelines 
•    Evaluate communication, navigation and surveillance options 
•    Demonstrate an airspace system architecture based on NASA’s UTM construct 
•    Collect initial assessments of passenger and community perspectives on vehicle ground noise, cabin 
noise and on-board ride quality” 
Although the X2 simulation was initially designed without the in-time safety assurance system concept 
in mind, the ecosystem (based on UTM) allowed for fairly direct migration and evaluation of 
interoperability. This also allowed the opportunity to see if the system design was flexible enough to be 
applied within a different underlying simulation framework. For X2, the ‘Testbed’ sim was used for 
traffic simulation, rather than the AOL sim that had been used for prior UTM studies. In this 
environment, we were able to monitor the data stream being passed across the ActiveMQ messaging 
server and subscribe to messages of interest while the experiment was underway. This was done by 
connecting to a “broker” messaging adapter that published and subscribed to all of the UAM-specific 
message types. The in-time safety assurance services were able to listen and record all sim data sent 
from both NASA and industry participants via this connection through the use of two message types. 
These types are described in more detail below.  
A UssWebSocketAdapter was chosen in particular because it was able to access both the Track data 
from the Traffic Publisher, the MACS simulated Track data, and the UAM-specific data being 
communicated to the NASA USS. 
The architecture used for the simulation is shown in Figure F-9, with the in-time safety assurance 
services denoted as ‘Testbed PaaS’. Connections were via an Amazon Web Services (AWS) gateway 
using a RESTful interface. While this diagram is an over-simplification of the overall architecture, it does 
show the industry partner elements (in blue) and underscores the idea that services communicated via 
the use of TestBed adapters. 
The adapter software was installed via the Testbed’s SDK package. Installation was straightforward, 
though some modifications were required for each test in order to connect with the correct instance of 
                                                          
1 [Online] https://www.nasa.gov/uamgc  
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the publisher. During this phase of the simulation, only data subscription was tested. For future tests 
and during GC demonstrations, end-to-end capability would be evaluated (i.e., publish back to the data 
bus information about airspace safety metric tracking and predictions. 
 
Figure F-9. X2 Simulation Architecture 
Data collected from the ActiveMQ communication bus came in two distinct datatypes and one sub- 
type: UAMPosition, UAMCommonFlightProfile and its subtype TrajectoryChangePoint. 
UAMCommonFlightProfile datatype includes 12 parameters, including for example aircraft ID, takeoff 
time, trajectory change points, cruise altitude, and cruise speed. TrajectoryChangePoints subtype 
included for each point, waypoint name, location, speed and ETA expected at the point. UAMPosition 
includes 12 parameters, including for example time, position, altitude, track, and ground speed of the 
simulated vehicle. Note: The reference vehicle was modeled as having four lifting rotors for vertical 
takeoff, and a forward propeller and wings for forward flight. 
The test cards were designed to run through three use cases under two different traffic conditions and 
different configurations of autonomy. Overall there were three use cases, with two different traffic 
scenarios and three autonomy configurations for a total of 24 test cards. Details of the experiment 
design are to be published separately by researchers in the ATM-X project.  
Data collected during the simulated flights is currently being analyzed, but it should be noted that the 
intent of the participation in the X2 simulation was to enable future integration across UAM-related 
projects, and to identify gaps or barriers regarding effective information exchange and interoperability 
of ATM functions with in-time safety assurance functions. 
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Appendix G. Acronym List 
 
ADS-B Automatic Dependent Surveillance - Broadcast 
AIM Aeronautical Information Management 
AIS Aeronautical Information Services 
AIXM Aeronautical Information Exchange Model 
AMSL Above Mean Sea Level 
ANSP Air Navigation Service Provider 
ASAP  Aviation Safety Action Programs  
ASIAS Aviation Safety Information Analysis and Sharing  
ASRS Aviation Safety Reporting System 
ATC Air Traffic Control 
ATM Air Traffic Management 
BBN Bayesian Belief Network  
BHM Battery Health Monitoring 
BP Battery Prognostics 
CANbus Controller Area Network Bus 
cFS Core Flight System 
CAS Convergent Aeronautics Solutions 
COTS Commercial Off The Shelf  
DC Direct Current 
DoF Degrees of Freedom 
DPAL Data Processing Assurance Level 
DQR Data Quality Requirement 
EOD End Of Discharge 
EPT Engine Power Train 
ESC Electronic Speed Controller 
ETA Estimated Time of Arrival 
FIMS Flight Information Management Systems  
FIXM Flight Information Exchange Model 
GBAS Ground Based Augmentation System 
GCS  Ground Control System 
GPS Global Positioning System 
GRASP Ground Risk Assessment Service Provider  
GUI Graphical User Interface 
HRRR High Resolution Rapid Refresh 
ICAROUS  Independent Configurable Architecture for Reliable Operations of Unmanned Systems 
IMU Inertial Measurement Unit 
IMU Interval Management 
INS Inertial Navigation System 
IASMS In-Time Aviation Safety Management System  
ISSA In-Time System-Wide Safety Assurance 
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JSON Javascript Object Notation 
LAANC Low Altitude Authorization and Notification Capability 
LOCD-IN Location Corrections through Differential Networks 
MAVLink Micro Air Vehicle Link 
MOR Mandatory Occurrence Reports 
NAS National Airspace System 
NAVQ Navigation system Quality service 
NPCRA Non-Participant Casualty Risk Assessment  
NSQ Navigation System Quality 
OS&N Observation Stations and Network 
PATs Precursors, Anomalies, and Trends 
PCE Polynomial Chaos Expansion  
PIREP Pilot Report 
PtR Proximity to Risk 
PtT Proximity to Threat 
PWM Pulse Width Modulation 
QOI  Quantities of Interest  
R&D Research and Development 
RC Remote Control 
RFI Radio Frequency Interference 
RTA Run-Time Assurance 
RTL  Return To Launch 
RTRA Real-Time Risk Assessment 
SAIL Specific Assurance and Integrity Level 
SDSP Supplemental Data Service Providers  
SMS Safety Management 
SORA  Specific Operations Risk Assessment 
sUAS Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems  
SWIM System-Wide Information Management  
SWS System-Wide Safety 
TA Time of Arrival 
UAM Urban Air Mobility 
UAS  Unmanned Aircraft Systems 
UAV Unmanned Aerial Vehicle 
UM Uncertainty Management 
UQ Uncertainty Quantification 
URAF UTM Risk Assessment Framework 
USS UAS Service Suppliers 
UTM UAS Traffic Management 
WAAS Wide Area Augmentation System 
WGS84 World Geodetic System 1984  
WXXM  Weather Information Exchange Model 
 
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE
Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8/98)
Prescribed by ANSI Std. Z39.18
Form Approved 
OMB No. 0704-0188
The public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data
sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other
aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing the burden, to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information
Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other
provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.
PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.
2. REPORT TYPE 3. DATES COVERED (From - To)
5a.  CONTRACT NUMBER
5b.  GRANT NUMBER
5c.  PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER
5d.  PROJECT NUMBER
5e.  TASK NUMBER
5f.  WORK UNIT NUMBER
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)
10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)
11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT
NUMBER(S)
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)
12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:
a. REPORT b. ABSTRACT c. THIS PAGE
17. LIMITATION OF
ABSTRACT
18. NUMBER
OF
19a.  NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
19b.  TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include area code)
(757) 864-9658
NASA Langley Research Center
Hampton, VA 23681-2199
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Washington, DC 20546-0001
NASA-TM-2020-220440
8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION
REPORT NUMBER
L-21052
1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY)
1-01-2020 Technical Memorandum
STI Help Desk (email: help@sti.nasa.gov)
U U U UU
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE
Architecture and Information Requirements to Assess and Predict Flight 
Safety Risks During Highly Autonomous Urban Flight Operations 
PAGES
NASA
    
  340428.02.40.07.01
Unclassified-
Subject Category  03
Availability: NASA STI Program (757) 864-9658
14. ABSTRACT   
15. SUBJECT TERMS
Assurance; Complexity; Modeling; Unmanned Aircraft; Urban Air Mobility
6. AUTHOR(S)
.
80
Young, Steve D.; Ancel, Ersin; Moore, Andrew J.; Dill, Evan T.; Quach, Cuong 
C.; Foster, John V.; Darafsheh, Kaveh; Smalling, Kyle M.; Vazquez, Sixto L.; 
Evans, Emory T.; Okolo, Wendy; Corbetta, Matteo; Ossenfort, John; 
Watkins, Jason; Kulkarni, Chetan S.; Spirkovska, Liljana
This report comprises architecture and information requirements and considerations toward enabling such a capability within the 
domain of low altitude highly autonomous urban flight operations. This domain may span, for example, public-use surveillance 
missions flown by small unmanned aircraft (e.g., infrastructure inspection, facility management, emergency response, law 
enforcement, and/or security) to transportation missions flown by larger aircraft that may carry passengers or deliver products.
